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CHAPTER I
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND RATIONALE
Long a restricted domain of theology and philosophy the study
of moral development has recently become a scientifically respectable
area for research in psychology.

Since the publication of his work,

The Moral Judgment of the Child (1932), Piaget has been recognized as
a pioneer in the developmental study of moral development.

However,

Piaget's major concern is cognitive development to which he has
devoted his career.

The relatively recent upsurge of interest in

moral development can be attributed to Lawrence Kohlberg (1958),
whose research has been of significant heuristic value.

The scientif-

ic study of moral development is in its early developmental stages and
is clearly resistant to easy solutions.

However, it is a field for

which society implicitly, if not explicitly, is asking.

As Jessor

(1975) states, "The importance of the work on moral development and
its implications for society warrant the imagination and effort
involved," (p. 179).
Kohlberg (1975) equates moral development with moral judgment,
and argues that the values underlying moral judgments can be evaluated
within a framework of levels and stages of moral development.
Although he states that other factors influence moral behavior, he
views moral reasoning as the only distinctive moral factor in "moral"
behavior.

For Kohlberg, the distinctive evaluative criterion for

"moral" action is the level of moral judgment.
1
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Since Kohlberg's initial contribution (1958), an increasing
amount of literature has developed concerning moral development.
Reviewing a sample of recent research in moral development, DePalma
(1975) and Jessor (1975) state that, for the most part, such research
has neglected to address itself to individual differences, specifically, personality variables that may influence the levels of moral
development.

By and large, the reported research has not been an-

chored in a theoretical framework.

A great deal of research has been

conducted with children addressing itself to particular aspects of
behavior, (e.g. donation of a small amount of money or candy in the
investigation of helping and sharing behavior), that have little
relation to higher levels of moral reasoning especially at the matureprincipled level.

Hogan (1975) cautions that if researchers continue

to deal only with specific problems, exclusive of a general theoretical
framework, their studies may be reduced to academic triviality.

Hogan

(1973) proposes the rooting of moral development research in
personality theory.

Based in personality theory, Hogan concentrates

on character structure, (viewed as a function of a person's largely unconscious typical way of selecting, using, justifying, and enforcing
rules), and proposes five variables that significantly effect character structure and subsequently moral development, namely:

moral

knowledge, ethics of conscience-ethics of responsibility continuum,
socialization, empathy, and autonomy.

Socialization, empathy, and

autonomy are reported to be developmental in nature.
Although Hogan does not subscribe to a stage model of moral
development, the present study addresses itself to the problem of incorporating Kohlberg's stage model within the theoretical framework

3

suggested by Hogan.

Kohlberg's stage model gives a logical basis for

coordinating concepts.

Hogan's model gives a theoretical framework

for research in moral development.
Two critical age periods have been hypothesized by Kohlberg and
Kramer (1969) for the attainment of principled level of moral reasoning, the first being the period of preadolescence, ages ten to
thirteen; the second, the period of late adolescence, ages fifteen to
nineteen.

Kohlberg and Kramer suggest that if during the preadoles-

cent period a solid conventional level of moral reasoning is not
attained, then principled moral reasoning is unlikely to be attained
in adulthood.

They further contend that during the late adolescent

period at least twenty percent of principled moral reasoning is
required for the person to develop principled moral reasoning in
adulthood.
Since much research in moral development has been conducted
without being incorporated into a theoretical framework and without
consideration of individual differences, the present study addresses
itself specifically to this problem by investigating three developmental personality variables as they are related to Kohlberg's
developmental stages of moral development, at the two age periods of
preadol~scence

and late adolescence.

The study investigates the

relationship between the personality variables of socialization
(assessed by the social standards subscale of the California Test of
Personality, Thorpe et al, 1953), autonomy (assessed by the self
reliance subscale of the California Test of Personality), and empathy
(assessed by a modified scale of empathy based on Mehrabian and
Epstein, 1972), and the stages of moral reasoning for the two age
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periods of preadolescence (assessed by Carroll's Test, 1974), and
late adolescence (assessed by the Defining Issues Test, Rest, 1972).
One hundred seventh grade students from a suburban Chicago public
school were randomly assigned to the preadolescent group; one hundred
and nine college students from a suburban Chicago junior college were
assigned to the late adolescent group, each group being equally
balanced for sex.
The study was designed to provide information concerning the
following questions:
(1)

Is there a statistically significant relationship between

the developmental variables of autonomy, socialization, empathy
and the stages of moral reasoning for the seventh grade and
college samples?
(2)

What is the relationship between autonomy and dominant

stage of moral reasoning, between socialization and dominant
stage of moral reasoning, between empathy and dominant stage of
moral reasoning for the

hm

samples?

(3)

What is the magnitude of any significant relationships?

(4)

Is there a statistically significant difference between the

relationship of autonomy, socialization, and empathy, taken as
separate variables, with the dominant stage of moral reasoning
for the different age groups?
(5)

Are there significant sex differences in autonomy, social-

ization, and empathy, taken separately, and in relation to the
dominant stage of moral reasoning for either age group?
Information concerning these questions may very well have far
reaching educational implications for schools, teachers, teacher

5

training institutions> and parents in relation to.the
the child.

mora~

growth of

The atmosphere of school and classroom (as well as the

home) facilitates or inhibits a child's growth in many areas.

Even

though the socialization of the child may be basically completed by
the time the child enters school (as Hogan claims), parents and
teachers serve as primary models in stimulating the depth and breadth
of the socialization process for the child.

An atmosphere of openness

to experience where the child receives empathic treatment from
parents, administrators, and teachers and is exposed to a variety of
role taking experiences stimulates growth in empathy.

Parents and

teachers who are strong, individualistic, independent, demanding, and
yet fair, and who clearly label certain actions as right or wrong,
explain rules, and make praise contingent on the attainment of
specified standards, provide children with clear models for autonomous
behavior (Baumrind, 1971).
In order to become a facilitator and stimulator of moral grmvth
in the child many skills are required of the teacher, namely:
knowledge of the stage of moral reasoning for each child; the ability
to communicate at a level of one stage above the child's moral reasoning stage; the ability to produce moral conflict, the resolution of
which leads the child to a greater awareness of a h_igher stage or
moral reasoning; (in discussions or moral dilemmas) the ability of
utilizing real life situations relevant to the students' lives.

It is

safe to say that most teachers do not possess these necessary skills.
School districts must be willing to provide long term in-service
training for all those ivho are involved in the education of the child
in order for these persons to facilitate and stimulate an atmosphere
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that will be conducive to moral growth.
willing to obtain such training.

School personnel must be

Teacher training institutions must

be willing to revise their curricula so that future teachers will have
the necessary skills and attitudes.

If schools are to make progress

in the area of moral development, boards of education and administrators must take the lead in their commitment to moral education and
all that this implies.
A major implication, constituting a most delicate problem faced
by school systems, is the reaction of parents to moral education.
TI1is problem could possibly be alleviated by keeping the parents
informed, by including parents on planning committees for moral education, and by holding public meetings open to all members of the
community where the goals and objectives of moral education are presented

and questions are answered.

By fostering the concept that the

schools and parents are partners in the total education of the child,
and by operationalizing this concept, school systems lay a foundation
whereby delicate issues such as moral education are addressed with
openness and integrity, and provide a setting in which constructive
solutions for delicate problems can be determined.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The review of the literature will begin with a historical overview of the psychoanalytically oriented interpretation of moral
development, and a review of the Character Education Inquiry of Hartshorne, May, and their colleagues.

The major part of this chapter

will be devoted to reviewing the literature concerning three major
contemporary interpretations of moral development:

(1)

The Social

Learning Interpretation (Bandura and Mischel); (2) The Cognitive
Developmental Interpretation (Piaget and Kohlberg); (3) The Characterological Interpretation (Hogan).

The major conceptual framework and

research supporting each interpretation will be systematically
presented.
Historical Perspective
Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Moral Development:

Freud has

greatly influenced psychology's view concerning moral development.
Although researchers may disagree with some of Freud's conclusions,
most accept his basic premise:

that sometime

in early childhood,

the child begins to introject the behavior of the parent, and through
the process of identification with the same sex parent, codes of
conduct, such as moral standards and values, which originally were
externally enforced, become internalized as part of the child's own
standards.
Freud viewed personality as composed of three systems- id, ego,
7
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and super-ego, the latter being the last system to be developed.
Freudian theory conceives of the super-ego as the internal representation of the values and ideals of society as interpreted to the child
by his parents and enforced by sanctions that reduce or increase
tension.

The super-ego is considered as the moral arm of

personality~

representing the ideal rather than the real, striving for perfection
rather than pleasure.

The child wishing to reduce tension learns to

develop his behavior as demanded by his parents.

The super-ego

consists of two subsystems, the conscience and the ego-ideal.

Whatever

the parent dictates as wrong and punishes the child for, tends to be
incorporated into the child's conscience.

\Vhatever is approved and

rewarded by the parent, tends to be incorporated into the child's egoideal.

The conscience is the punishing

subsystem~.

of the super-ego

making the person feel guilty; the ego-ideal is the subsystem that
rewards the person by making him feel proud of himself.

Freudian

theory views the role of the parent as paramount in the moral development of the child.
Hoffman (1962) reviewing research on the role of the parent in
the child's moral growth draws three conclusions from psychoanalyt-ically
oriented studies (Allinsmith, 1960; Aronfreed, 1959; Greening, 1955;
Heinicke, 1953; Hoffman and Saltzstein, 1960; MacKinnon, 1938; Mussen,
1956; Sears, 1953; Sears, Maccoby, and Levin, 1957).

First, identifi-

cation of the child with the parent is promoted through the frequent
expression of warmth and affection; although there is some evidence
that a threatening and punitive approach might, in some cases, also
contribute to identification.

Second, the development of an internal

9

moral orientation, especially in the context of an affectionate
parent-child relationship is facilitated by the use of psychological
discipline (i.e. measures which seek to have the child feel that he
has fallen short of some ideal or that he has hurt the parent and
consequently is less loved by the parent because of what he has done),
especially with respect to one's reactions following the violation of
a moral standard.

Physical discipline or techniques that directly

assert the parent's power over the child facilitate an external moral
orientation dependent upon fear of detection and punishment.

Third,

the type of internalized morality that develops, (e.g. whether it is
oriented predominantly toward human need or conventional authority)
may be influenced by the particular kind of psychological techniques
used, i.e. to what particular aspect of the child's need system does
the psychological discipline generally appeal, such as needs for
affection, self esteem, and concern for others.
A word of caution is in order concerning the generalization of
these conclusions.

Since research on which the conclusions are based

used mainly male subjects, generalization of these conclusions applies
mainly to males.

Psychoanalytic theory has always been better

articulated and understood with respect to males.
sugges~s

However, research

that the psychological forces induced in the discipline

situation which facilitate internal moral orientation are different for
boys and girls.

In boys it seems to be guilt over the effects of the

child's behavior on the parent; in girls it seems to be anxiety over
losing parental love.
The psychoanalytic interpretation of moral development does not
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subscribe to moral education in the school since the processes of
identification and internalization are said to be accomplished by the
age of five and the developmental study of morality is not necessary
after that age.

The Freudian interpretation of moral development

emphasizes feelings as the basis for moral conduct (conscience and
guilt).

Moral development consists of the identification and the

internalization of the parent's standards and values in the child's
super-ego, which is formed by the age of five.

Morality is culturally

relative within a framework of universal psycho-sexual stages, with
the parent being the central influence in the moral development of the
child.
Character Education Inquiry:

The pioneering research of

Hart~

shorne, May, and their colleagues (Hartshorne and May, 1928; Hartshorne, May, and Maller, 1929; Hartshorne, May, and Shuttleworth,
1930) set the precedent for studying moral character in that they not
only utilized verbal responses but also observed the concrete behaviors
of children, such as cheating, sharing, and the like.

The subjects

included eight thousand public school and three thousand private
school children between the ages of eleven and fourteen.

An attempt

was made to measure each child's moral knowledge and actual conduct
concerning honesty and service.

The results reported that almost all

children cheat so that they cannot be described as honest or dishonest.
Cheating is situation specific so that it is not a character trait
that makes a person cheat.

Verbalizations concerning the value of

honesty have little influence on actual behavior, the decision to cheat
being based on the expediency of the situation and on the degree of
risk and effort required.

Honesty is also situation specific depending
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on group approval and example rather than on internal moral values.
The conclusions showed that there was no such thing as generality in
moral behavior, the results showing little evidence for unified
character traits but showing much evidence that moral conduct is
situation specific.

Accordingly, it was concluded that there was no

such thing as individual character structured of virtues and vices;
the child could learn only specific habits, in specific situations,
and therefore there was no need for studying moral development, and
moral education in the school would be ineffective.

However, the

subjects in the Character Education Inquiry were in early adolescence
and preadolescence and it can be argued that they were at earlier
stages of moral development in terms of Kohlberg's stages.

Kohlberg

(1969) found that thirteen year old boys most often gave responses
associated \vith stage three of moral reasoning, followed by stage four
and stage two next in order of frequency.

Kohlberg argues that in this

age range moral judgment is developing and incorporating values unfavorable to aggression and to theft, but not yet to cheating.

Whereas

theft and aggression have obvious harmful consequences for others,
cheating does not and requires a more advanced stage of moral reasoning
to appreciate it as a moral imperative, probably stage four or above.
Thus, among the age group studied by Hartshorne and Hay, resistance
to cheating is determined by situational and expediancy factors.

At

later developmental stages, Kohlberg (1969) finds cheating decreasing,
producing a correlation between amount of cheating and stage of moral
reasoning.

MacKinnon (1938) used college students as his subjects

utilizing the methodology of the Character Education Inquiry in order
to attempt a repudiation of the theory of specificity.

After

12

interviewing the subjects concerning moral verbalizations he observed
their behavior in a situation that offered the opportunity of
apparently unseen cheating.

Consistency \vas found in both honest and

dishonest subjects and a general trait of honesty was said to be
evidenced.

In light of his data, MacKinnon concluded that the

results rejected

the specificity theory of Hartshorne and

~1ay.

Hm<~

ever, two different samples were used, preadolescents and adolescents
by Hartshorne and May, college students by MacKinnon.

The results

of both investigations are consistent with Kohlberg's assumption that
cheating requires a higher stage of moral reasoning than do theft and
aggression, a stage four or perhaps higher.

Theoretically, the

college students in MacKinnon's investigation could have been at stage
four or higher of moral reasoning so that the results of the Hartshorne-May studies and the MacKinnon study may well not be contradictory to each other but complementary depending on the stage of
moral reasoning of the subjects.
Bandura's and Mischel's Social Learning Interpretation of Moral
Development
Since the late nineteenth century, observation followed by
imitation has been recognized by psychologists as a principal mode of
learnin.g.

However, during the behavioristic revolution, observational

or social learning theory fell into disrepute.

Bandura is credited

for calling attention to this long neglected mode of learning and for
sharpening the distinctive features that differentiate social learning
from instrumental learning.

In addition, Bandura has been responsible

13

for a series of detailed studies that have invest_igated the variables
influencing social

learning~

such as the stimulus properties of the

model, types of behavior shmm by the model, the consequences of the
model's behavior, and the motivational set given to the subject.
Bandura (1971) states that Behaviorism 1s validly criticized for
neglecting determinants of human behavior arising from man's
cognitive functioning so that traditional behavioral theories provide
an incomplete account of human behavior.

Cognitive processes (coding,

imagery, symbolic representations, problem solving) are said to be
involved in controlling the influence of reinforcement contingencies,
in controlling or reinforcing one's own actions, in thinking out and
evaluating alternate actions, and in supporting or,altering one's self
concept.

Central to the social learning position is the concept of

imitative or observational learning.

A critical component of observa-

tional learning is the nature of vicarious consequences, that is, the
consequences, positive or negative, that come to a model for his or her
behavior.

A person will tend to perform or inhibit a response learned

vicatiously to the extent that he believes he will be rewarded or
punished in such a way.

Reinforcement may also alter the level of

observational learning by affecting what or who the observer will
attend to and how actively he codes and rehearses the model behavior.
Social learning emphasizes that the child's percepts are the
basis for his behavior.

The child observes the behavior of others and

uses it as a model for imitation.

If the child is to learn from the

model, the model stimulus must be attended to.

If the behavior of the

model is to exert influence upon the child's future behavior, then the
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behavior of the model has to be coded symbolically, represented, and
retained until the future arrives.

The motivational factor deter-

mining the expression of cognitions and behaviors learned earlier is
said to be the anticipation of reinforcement.
do not come suddenly.

New forms of behavior

They are the result of long periods of

conditioning which reinforce the person's approximations toward the
desired behavior.

In order for the approximations to begin, the

person must first observe and then imitate a model.

Whether or not

the observation of a model is followed by continuing imitation will
depend upon whether the attempted imitation of the model's behavior is
rewarded.

Miller and Dollard (1941) have suggested that the child's

tendency to imitate is an acquired secondary drive.

The child may

spontaneously or coincidentally imitate the behavior of another.
When this is done the social environment rewards the child and reinforces his tendency to imitate.

Bandura and Walters (1959) view rein-

forcement of imitative behavior as the basis of most acceptable
behavior.

They contend that when a child is told to behave in a

certain fashion, whether verbally by instruction from the model or nonverbally by observation of the model if the schedule of reinforcement
is appropriate, the child will behave in that fashion.

Contrary to

Freudian theory, Bandura (1968) does not assume that the parents serve
as the exclusive source of the child's moral judgments and behavior.
Bandura calls particular attention to the important roles played by
extra familial adults, and by the child's peers.
Hischel (1973) contends that when we are looking at behavior or
attempting to predict behavior, the cognitive act, social experiences,
and the specific situation all must be examined.

The person is not an
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empty organism so that the cognitive social learning view looks at
how persons mediate the impact of outside stimuli and generate distinctive complex behavioral patterns.

l\Iischel and Mischel (1976)

state that a comprehensive psychological analysis of morality must
consider both moral judgments and moral behavior.

They distinguish

between the competency or capacity (potency) that a person possesses
to generate moral behaviors and the incentives or motivation for
moral performance in particular situations.

Even though a person has

the competency to generate moral behavior, the actual performance
depends on motivational variables.

Intelligence is viewed as having a

major role in the development of moral competencies.

Mischel and

Mischel (1975) view intellectual competencies, age, and certain
demographic variables, such as socioeconomic status and education, to
be among the best predictors of the adequacy of social functioni_ng.
Moral competency is said to include the ability to reason about moral
dilemmas and encompass role-taking skills and empathy "of the sort
required to take account of the long term consequences of different
courses of action" (p. 4).
Since considerable differences of moral reasoning and moral
behavior may be displayed by the same person across different situations, .such individual differences and differences between people are
accounted for in terms of each individual's unique social history.
person who possesses the needed moral competency is capable of moral
behavior; but whether he translates the capacity (potency) into
performance (act) depends on specific motivational performance
considerations in the particular situation, the person variables of
most importance being the individual's expectancies and subjective

A
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values.

A person has a great number of behaviors from which he is

capable of constructing within any situation.

What guides the person

is his own expectancies about the consequences of the behavioral
possibilities.

These expectancies depend on the outcomes a person has

received for similar behavior in similar situations and also on the
outcomes the person has observed occuring to other people.

All moral

behavior, even that of the highest level, depends on expected
consequences, which may range from immediate, concrete consequences
for self, to autonomy from external rewards, including distant and
abstract considerations and self reactions on the part of the person.
Such autonomy does not mean that moral behavior no longer depends on
expected consequences, but that the outcomes are more and more
contingent upon the person achieving or violating his own standards,
and on consequences that go beyond immediate concrete externally
administered consequences.
Different individuals may share similar expectancies about
consequences and yet may choose different moral behavior patterns due
to the differences in the subjective values each places on the
expected consequences.

Even if the subjective values for a specific

behavior are shared, individuals may differ in their tolerance of
behavioral deviations from the norms both in their

O\m

behavior or in

the behavior of others.
In every day life moral behavior depends on moral choices \-.rhich
often require high levels of self control and attention to distant
consequences of action.

Such prolonged self control sequences hinge

on the person's ability to regulate personal behavior amid strong
temptations and pressures for long periods, without any obvious or
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immediate external rewards.

To go from moral thought to moral conduct

requires self regulation.
Moral behavior is said to be controlled by expected consequences,
many of these being externally administered.

However, each individual

also regulates his own behavior by self imposed goals and standards
and self produced consequences.

In attempting to attain the

standards that a person sets for himself, the road may be long and
arduous.

Mischel and Mischel (1976) hold that progress can be mediated

by covert symbolic activities, (i.e. as the person reaches sub goals
he uses self praise and self instruction to maintain goal directed
behavior).

Positive self appraisal and self reinforcement tend to

occur when a person reaches self imposed standards; psychological self
condemnation may result if the person fails to reach important self
imposed goals.

This self regulatory system requires "priority rules"

for determining the sequence of behavior and "stop rules" for terminating a particular sequence of behavior.

Moral behavior as any other

complex human action depends on the execution of long, interlocking
sequences of thought and behavior.

Mischel feels that the concept of

"plans" defined as the hierarchical processes "which control the order
in which an organism performs a sequence of operations" is applicable
here and merits much more attention than it has received.

Mischel

alerts us to the fact that a person may possess high moral principles
and engage in harmful, aggressive, immoral behavior.
Accordingly, the social learning interpretation of moral development views moral behavior as a function of the person's conditioning
and modeling history.

In contrast to the Freudian viewpoint, moral
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learning continues throughout life, the environment being the primary
determinant of moral behavior.

Morality is culturally relative and

the role of adults and peers is critical, since they dispense rewards
and punishment and serve as models.

The function of the teacher is to

serve as a good model and to reward appropriate behavior.

The social

learning interpretation is not dependent on sequentially hierarchical
stages of moral development.

Advancement in moral behavior occurs

mainly in imitation of the behavior of others; the child is stimulated
to change toward more appropriate behavior through modeling and
rewards obtained for acceptable moral behavior.

As learning continues,

the achievement of a particular standard may take on reinforcing
qualities of its own because past achievement has been paired with
external reinforcement.
standards of performance.

The child gradually internalizes the
The goal is to have the person eventually

develop standard setting and reinforcement for moral behavior
independent of externally controlled consequences.
Research Supporting the Social Learning Interpretation of Moral
Development
Adkins et al (1974) in reviewing research on moral development
cite a number of studies employing the social learning interpretation
of moral behavior.

Much recent social learning research has

addressed itself to the relationship between observation of a model
and prosocial behavior.

A few studies have concentrated on the

relationship between observation of a model and resistance to
temptation.
Several researchers studied college and adult subjects in their
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naturalistic settings exposi_ng the subjects to a model condition
where the model engaged in specific prosocial behavior.

In contrast

to subjects who were not exposed to the model condition, results
revealed increased rates of:

volunteering (Rosenbaum, 1956),

donating (Bryan and Test, 1967), signing a petition

(Hain~

Graham,

fvlouton, and Blake, 1956), and helping to change a tire or complete a
task (Test and Bryan, 1969).

Laboratory studies employing model

conditions in contrast to no model conditions showed that children
exposed to the model condition increased anonymous donation activity
(Rosenhan and White, 1967), sharing behavior (Harris, 1971) and rescue
attempts (Staub, 1971).

Witnessing a model engaged in non prosocial

behavior or refusing to engage in prosocial behavior, decreased acts
of volunteering (Schachter and Hall, 1952), and donation (Wheeler and
Wagner, 1968).

Schachter and Hall (1952) demonstrated that exposure

of subjects to a volunteering model increased the rate of offering
to volunteer; however, these subjects were found not to differ from
controls who had not been exposed to modeling in the actual performance
of the task that they had volunteered to perform.
A few studies have explored the relationship of model nurturance
to prosocial behavior.

Midlarsky and Bryan (1967) found that the

increased model nurturance in the form of hugging did not increase
altruistic behavior in children.

In an investigation of donation

behavior, with fourth and fifth grade students as subjects, Rosenhan
and White (1967) had the subjects interact with either a warm, neutral,
or hostile adult model during a pre-experimental session.
subjects were exposed to a test for donation behavior.

Later the

Results

revealed no difference among subjects exposed to the three different
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model conditions.

Grusec and Skubiski (1970) using third and fifth

grade subjects exposed to either a high or a low nurturance model
found no significant differences as a function of model nurturance.
Hornstein, Fisch, and Holmes (1968) contrived an interesting
situation in which a model "found" a wallet, wrote a letter to the
owner, and then accompanied by the model's letter, the wallet was
"relost."

Adult subjects then came upon the wallet and the letter.

Results showed that those subjects who believed that they were similar
to the model returned the wallet more frequently when the letter
indicated the model felt good or neutral rather than bad, about
returning the wallet .. When the letter revealed that the model was
dissimilar, the model's feelings had no effect.

Midlarsky and Bryan

(1972) used fourth and fifth grade subjects who were exposed to a model
who expressed positive affect either contingently or non contingently
following acts of greed or charity.

Results showed that expression of

contingent positive affect significantly influenced anonymous donation
behavior.

The researchers further investigated the generalization of

the donation behavior.

Results showed that the effect did not hold up

on a generalization task a week and a half later.
White (1967) instructed fourth grade children to donate half of
their winnings to charity.

The experimental group who had received

the instruction donated significantly more than the control group, but
the effect did not generalize to a second test several days later.
Several studies have exposed children to models who reminded them to
practice charity or greed or were_neutral in their admonitions, in
contrast to physical demonstration of donating behavior by the model,
(Bryan, 1971; Bryan and Schwartz, 1971; Bryan and Walbek 1970a; Walbek
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1969),

Results showed that such exhortations do not affect young

children's donation behavior.

However, observation of the model who

donated, usually affected donation behavior significantly.

Al tho.ugh

exhortations merely reminding children of prosocial behavior do not
seem to affect donation behavior, there is some evidence from a study
by Midlarsky and Bryan (1972) that exhortations that are rational and
justify what is being preached do have significant influence on the
donating behavior of fourth and fifth grade children.

Gelfand et al

(1975) using kindergarten and first grade subjects who displayed a low
baseline rate of donating pennies to help a needy peer, exposed the
subjects to instructional prompts to donate, and the subjects were
praised for each donation.

The results showed that both instructional

prompts and praise appeared to increase the children's donation behavior.

It appears that these studies show that merely exhorting a

child to do something does not have a significant influence on the
child.

However, when the exhortation justifies why the child should

show charitable behavior, when the child sees a model demonstrate
charitable behavior, and when the child receives social reinforcement
for charitable acts, under these conditions a significant effect upon
the child's charitable behavior has been shown.
What is the effect of inconsistency in what the model says and
what he does?

A few studies (Bryan and Walbek, 1970b; Midlarsky and

Bryan, 1972) have investigated the effects on donation behavior by
exposing second to fifth grade subjects to a model who either preached
generosity but practiced greed, or preached greed but practiced
generosity.

Results showed that such inconsistency of the model has

not been found to significantly affect later donation behavior.

Payne
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(1974) addressing himself to the lack of effect on these children by
inconsistent models states that this result "would appear to indicate
that exposure of young children to models does not trigger articulate
cognitions regarding social obligations."

However, Mischel and

Liebert (1966) found that the inconsistency of a model did not affect
the children's behavior in the presence of an adult; hut when the
children were left alone (secretly observed) many of those who
observed the inconsistant model lm-rered their own standards, while
none of those in the consistant model condition did so.
A few studies utilizing young children as subjects have explored
the relationship between observation of a model and resistance to
temptation.

Bryan and Stein (1967) had kindergarten children observe

a model stealing M &M candy, thus yielding to temptation, and a model
who did not yield to the temptation; in one instance the model was an
adult, in another instance the model was a peer.

When the children

were left alone, the two groups did not differ in their resistance to
temptation.

Stein (1967) using four year old boys had his subjects

assigned to three groups; group 1 was assigned to a model yielding to
temptation condition; group 2 was assigned to a resisting model; group
3 was assigned to a no model condition.

Results showed that the

subjects exposed to the yielding model condition, yielded to temptation
significantly more than those exposed to a resisting model or no model
condition.

Those exposed to a resisting model did not differ

significantly from subjects who were not exposed to a model condition.
Actually, the control group (exposed to no model condition) demonstrated
slightly greater resistance than the group exposed to a resisting model
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condition.

An explanation given for the last result was that the

deviant response was less available to subjects who had not witnessed
a model (control group) than to those who had.

Walters and Parke

(1964) had five year old subjects observe a film in which a boy of
similar age played with a forbidden toy and later received a reward
or a punishment or neither reward nor punishment.
did not view the film.

The control group

On a subsequent task involving prohibitions

against playing with certain toys, children who had viewed the model
being rewarded or receiving no consequences, deviated more quickly,
more often, and for a longer period than control subjects.

There was

no significant difference between the group who viewed the model being
punished and the control group.
Bandura and McDonald (1963) attempted to modify children's moral
judgments which were obtained on a pre-test using Piaget's story pairs.
The age range of the children was from five to ten years.
procedures were used in the experimental phase.

Three

The first involved only

reinforcement in the form of praise when a child gave an advanced
judgment as compared to the pretest.

The second condition involved the

children evaluating story pairs but alternating with an adult model who
expressed moral judgments in opposition to the child's original
orientation.

The third condition was the same as the second with the

addition of praise when the child made a judgment of the kind made by
the model.

Having completed the experimental phase, the children were

taken into another room by an adult different than the model and were
asked to evaluate twenty more story pairs.

During this phase no praise

or criticism was given and the model was not present.

Results showed
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that although praise alone was relatively ineffective in modifying
the children's moral judgment orientation, modeling exerted a powerful
influence in modifying the children's moral judgments.

Cowan et al

(1969) performed a study designed to replicate and extend the study of

Bandura and

~lcDonald.

The time between modeling and posttest was

lengthened and a wider sampling of moral judgment items was used.

The

results constituted an impressive replication of the earlier study by
Bandura and McDonald.

Cowan et al argued that modeling studies provide

data on limited aspects of moral judgment, overlooking several
dimensions of moral reasoning as well as intention consequences which
would be assessed by Piaget.

In reply to the paper by Cowan et al,

Bandura (1969) reasserts the social learning position on moral development and suggests that modeling influences are more important in moral
development than stage theories would lead us to believe.
In most natural situations, children as well as adults are not
exposed to a single model, but to a succession of models.
Liebert (1968),

Mc~1ains

Hill and

and Liebert (1968), and Liebert and Fernandez

(1969) conducted a series of experiments within a social learning frame-

work.

As a result of their work they have enumerated general state-

ments governing the effect of multiple modeling in relation to
specifi~

rules:

(1) A stated rule is more likely to be broken as the

number of others whom one observes breaking the rule increases; (2) A
rule is more likely to be followed as the number of others whom one
observes upholding the rule increases.
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Summary of Research Supporting the Social Learning View of
Moral

Development~

Social Learning studies have concentrated

on the relationship between modeling and prosocial.behavior.

A few

studies have addressed themselves to the relationship between modeling
and resistance to temptation.

The review of the research addressed

itself to four general areas of social learning as related to moral
development:

(1)

Relationship of modeling to prosocial behavior;

(2) Relationship of modeling to resistance to temptation; (3)
Relationship of modeling to moral reasoning; (4) Relationship of
multiple modeling to rule observance.
Observance of a model engaged in specific prosocial behavior has
increased rates of volunteering, donating, signing of a

petition~

help-

ing to change a tire, anonymous donating, sharing, and rescue
attempts, (Bryan and Test, 1967; Hain et al, 1956; Rosenbaum, 1956;
Rosenhan and White, 1967; Staub, 1971; Test and Bryan, 1969; White,
1967).
Exposure to a nurturant model (model warmth) had no significant
influence on altruistic and donating behavior, (Grusec and Skubiski,
1970; Hidlarsky and Bryan, 1967; Rosenhan and White, 1967).
Positive affect consequences as expressed by the model and
similarity to the model significantly influenced returni?g of a lost
object and anonymous donation behavior, (Hornstein, Fisch, and Holmes,
1968; Midlarsky and Bryan, 1972).

There is less evidence that praise

given to a model significantly affects donation and sharing behavior,
(Harris, 1970; Presbie and Coiteux, 1971).
Verbal instruction, exhortations that are justified, and physical
demonstration by models significantly affected donation behavior while
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mere

verbalization~

telling children to donate, did not affect their

donation behavior, (Bryan, 1971; Bryan and Schwartz, 1971; Bryan and
Walbek, 1970; Midlarsky and Bryan, 1972; Walbek, 1969; White, 1967).
Instructional prompts and praise increased donating behavior in young
children (Gelfand, et al, 1975).
Two studies, (Bryan and Walbek, 1970; Midlarsky and Bryan,
1972), showed that inconsistency in the verbal and physical behavior
of the model (e.g. preaching charity but practicing greed) did not
significantly affect later donation behavior.

In another study,

(Mischel and Liebert, 1966), inconsistent model behavior did not affect
the subjects' behavior while the adult was present.

However, when the

adult was not present and the children were secretly observed, inconsistent model condition subjects significantly lowered their
standards.
Observing a model yielding or resisting temptation did not affect
children's resistance to temptation, (Bryan and Stein, 1967), while
another study (Stein, 1967) found that exposure to a model yielding to
temptation significantly increased children's yielding to temptation.
Walters and Parke (1964) found that children viewing a model yielding
to temptation and later rewarded, or neither rewarded nor punished,
yielded more quickly, more often, and for a longer period of time than
control subjects.

There was no significant difference between the

control group and the subjects viewing the model bei_ng punished.
Although praise alone was ineffective, modeling exerted
significant influence in modifying children's moral reasoning.
(Bandura and McDonald, 1963).

Cowan et al (1969) attempted to replicate
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the Bandura-McDonald study.

Their results constituted an impressive

replication of the earlier study.
In a series of multiple modeling studies_, results showed that
verbally stated rules are more likely to be followed or broken as the
child observes increasing numbers of other people conforming to or
breaking the rule, (Hill and Liebert, 1968; Liebert and Fernandez,
1969; McMains and Liebert, 1968).
The evidence for short term specific influence of modeling is
well established.

However there has been a paucity of studies

attempting to verify that observation of a model produces enduring
dispositions .. (Midlarsky and Bryan, 1972; White, 1967), and these
studies attempted generalization studies a few days to a week and a
half later, with the result that the effect did not generalize.

As D.

L. Krebs (1970) has pointed out, before conclusions of acquired
behavioral dispositions can be made, the effects must be shown to be
generalizable to situations dissimilar to the testing situation.

Even

though social learning researchers have attempted to make laboratory
situations as real as possible, the question of unrepresentativeness,
due to the possible artificiality of laboratory measures, remains a
problem.
Much of the social learning research has dealt with trivial
forms of donating, sharing, and helping behavior, such as donating
pennies to a needy peer, (Gelfand, 1975).

Few investigations have

included higher levels of sharing and helping behavior such as giving
up a substantial amount of one's own time or money, or helping where
danger or risk exists.

Adkins et al (1974) state:
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... trivial or low cost, as opposed to high cost prosocial
behavior may follow different laws or be affected by different
variables. Until it has been demonstrated that the same laws
govern behavior in two different situations, it is unwarranted
to assume that the situations measure the same thi_ng (p. 122).
This may well account for the conflicting results concerning observation of an inconsistent model, (Bryan and Walbek, 1970; Midlarsky and
Bryan, 1972; Mischel and Liebert, 1966), and the effect of a yielding
to temptation model on subjects exposed to that condition, (Bryan
and Stein, 1967; Stein, 1967).
Since age ranges and sex differences were limited, these social
learning studies appear to give little information concerning
developmental trends and sex differences.

In future social learning

investigations, attempts should be made to conduct studies addressed
to developmental trends, sex differences, the generalization of modeling effects in naturalistic settings employing both low cost and high
cost prosocial behavior.

Arbutnot (1975) addressing himself to the

issue of modeling and reinforcement producing specific modification of
responses to moral judgments in children> states that these studies
may have succeeded only in training subjects to recognize moral
responses different from their own and to respond in the desired
manner to obtain reward or approval whether or not the children understood the responses.

Lickona (1976) explains the results of these

studies in terms of the distinction between structure and content.
Structure of thought is conceived as a filter that determines the
meaning and impact of content.

A person's susceptibility to influence

of content varies with the stage of moral development, with the greatest

~usceptibility

being at the conventional level since the person

depends on the group for moral definition of the situation.

The
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results obtained by Bandura and McDonald (1963) and Cowan et al (1969)
are seen as content overwhelming

structure so that the adult social

influence caused the children to abandon, at least temporarily, a
more advanced stage of moral development in favor of a lower stage
that focused on material

reinf~rcement.

And yet as Bandura (1969)

claims, modeling may well play a greater role in moral development
than stage theorists are willing to recognize.
Piaget's and Kohlberg's Cognitive Developmental Interpretation of Moral
Development
Piaget and his associates have been publishing their findings on
the development of cognitive processes in children since 1927.

The

extensive formulation of children's cognitive development was extended
to moral development in Piaget's work, The Horal Judgment of the Child
(1932).

The subjects studied by Piaget ranged in age from four to

thirteen years and were reported to be from the lower socioeconomic
sections of Geneva, Switzerland.

In order to measure the children's

level of moral judgment, Piaget presented pairs of stories to his
subjects.
(1)

The stories differed from each other on two dimensions:

the actual amount of damage done; (2) the intentions of the

transgressor.

The story pairs presented these dimensions in opposition

to each other and level of moral judgment was determined on how the
children responded to these dimensions.

An example of Piaget's stoty

pairs follows:
John was in his room when his mother called him to dinner.
John goes down and opens the door to the dining room. But
behind the door was a chair·' and on the chair was a tray with
fifteen cups on it. John did not know the cups were behind
the door. He opens the door, the door hits the tray, bang go
the fifteen cups, and they all get broken.
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One day when Henry's mother was out, Henry tried to get some
cookies out of the cupboard. He climbed up on a chair, but
the cookie jar was still too high, and he couldn't reach it.
But when he was trying to get the cookie jar, he knocked over
a cup. The cup fe 11 down and broke. (Piaget 1932)
The child was required to judge the naughtier of the two characters.
Piaget views moral development as following a sequence of three
stages.

Stage one is the blind obedience stage involving objective

morality or moral realism.

This stage lasts up to ages seven or eight

and corresponds to the sensori-motor and preoperational stages of
cognitive development.

The child's conception of morality is based

on what the parents forbid or permit.

Transgressions are evaluated

solely in terms of the amount of damage done without any consideration
of the transgressor's intent.
Stage two is the progressive equalitarian stage involving
subjective morality or moral relativism.

This stage spans the ages of

eight to eleven and corresponds to the concrete operational stage of
cognitive development.

Moral judgments take into account the spirit

of the law and are made in terms of the apparent intent of the transgressor, thereby being less absolute and authoritarian.
Stage three is the moral autonomy stage, involving the tempering
of purely equalitarian justice by considerations of equity, i.e.
considering the individual's particular situation.

This stage sets in

towards ages eleven to twelve and corresponds to the formal
operational stage of cognitive development.

Rules are perceived as

products of social interactions with peers and adults.
mutual agreement are paramount.

Reciprocity and

Authority for rules stem from social

consent and rules may be changed by consensus.

This stage is

accompanied by a degree of moral autonomy, and the child develops a
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sense of ethical and moral responsibility for behavior.

Piaget laid

the foundation for the refined extension of the cognitive developmental interpretation of moral development by Lawrence Kohlberg
(1958).
The main contemporary proponent of the stage dependent, cognitive developmental approach to moral development is Kohlberg.

He has

incorporated into his own elaborate model the Piagetian concepts of
developmental stage sequence, conflict, and imbalance as a necessary
precondition for advanced moral development.
Kohlberg (1968), Kohlberg and Turiel (1971) consider the child to
be a moral philosopher since when children's moral judgments are
examined, they have many standards that do not come in any obvious way
from parents, peers, or teachers but rather from a morality of their
own.

The main goals of Kohlberg and his associates are the develop-

mental stages a person must pass through to arrive at the principled
stage of moral reasoning.

The role of moral educators and moral

developmental psychologists is seen as focused on the prevention of a
child remaining at a lower level of moral reasoning when the child
begins to l.ag behind (Kohl berg and Turiel, 1971).
Although not as interested in moral behavior per se as in the
types of moral judgments a person makes, Kohlberg's levels and stages
of moral reasoning are structures of moral judgment.

What is important

and significant is not the content of the judgment, i.e. the choice
endorsed by the person, but the form, i.e. the process of

r~asoning

about the content or choices that involve a conflict of obligation.
The mere verbalization of a moral judgment does not define the
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structure or stage of moral development; what defines the stage is
the form, the why and how, of the verbalization.
Kohlberg acknowledges that one can reason in terms of principles
and not live up to them.

Although additional factors are necessary to

translate principled moral reasoning into moral performance, he
stresses that moral judgment is the only distinctive moral factor in
moral behavior.

Moral judgment change is long range and irreversible

so that a higher stage is never lost.

Moral behavior as such is

largely situational and reversible in new situations (Kohlberg, 1975).
Moral principles are defined as principles of choice for resolving conflicts of obligation (Kohlberg, 1971).
is a way of choosing that which is universal.

A moral principle

Accordingly, Kohlberg's

position is an absolutist view of morality and his universal absolute
is rooted in the Kantian conception of justice.

Kohlberg (1970)

defines justice as treating every man impartially regardless of the
man.
rules.

A fundamental distinction is made between moral principles and
Moral principles are universal and allow for no exception;

rules allow for and are subject to exceptions.
are also distinguished

f~om

Specific moral beliefs

moral principles since beliefs are con-

ceived of as being individually or culturally determined and therefore
relative in content (Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971).
Ten universal moral values are enumerated, namely;

punishment,

property, roles and concerns of affection, roles and concerns of
property, law, life, distributive justice, liberty, truth, and sex.
The stage of a person's moral reasoning defines what that individual
finds valuable in these issues, i.e. how the person defines the value
and the reasons he gives for valuing it.

Moral choice is said to
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involve choosi_ng

bet\.'~een

two or more of these values when they con-

flict in concrete situations of choice (Kohl berg, 1975).
Kohlberg (1958) originally defined three levels of moral development with two stages within each level.

r-lore recently a premoral

stage (stage 0) has been added resulting "in the formulation of the
seven culturally universal stages of moral development" (Kohlberg and
Turiel, 1971).

Table 1 presents the moral stages in terms of what is

right, the reason for doing good, and the social perspective behind
each stage.

It should be noted that Rest (1972, 1974, 1976)

distinguished stage five into substages five A and five
the morality of social contract, five
humanism.

~being

!•

five A being

the morality of intuitive

Although the literature does not usually associate this sub-

stage distinction with Kohlberg, he does make the distinction in his
1972 paper.

Most recently Kohlberg (1976) conceptualizes stage three

and above as having substages A and B.

He states,

We group the normative order and utilitarian orientation as
interpenetrating to form Type A at each stage. Type B focuses
on the interpenetration of the-justice orientation with an
ideal self orientation. Type A makes judgments ... in terms of
the given "out there." Type B-makes judgments ... in terms of
what ought to be, of what is Internally accepted by the self
(p. 40).
Kohlberg reportedly is thinking of adding a higher stage that would
account.for the moral maturity of prophets like Jesus and Buddha
(Woodward and Lord, 1976).
The stages are said to be sequentially invariant and hierarchical
(Kohlberg, 1970; Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972).
(1969) define an invariant sequence as one:

Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg

TABLE 1
THE MORAL STAGES
Level and Stage

What is Right

Reason for Doing Right

Social Perspective of
Stage

Stage 0 - Premoral

Good is what is
pleasant or exciting;
bad is what is fearful or painful .

Child is guided only by can
do, and want to do.

Presocial. Child
has no idea of
obligation, should,
have to, even in
terms of extreme
authority.

LEVEL I PRE CONVENTIONAL
Stage 1 Heteronomous
Morality

To avoid breaking
rules backed by
punishment,
obedience for its own
sake, and avoiding
physical damage to
persons and property.

Avoidance of punishment,
and the superior power
of authorities.

Egocentric point of
view. Doesn't
consider the
interests of others
or recognize that
they differ from the
actor's; doesn't
relate two points of
view. Actions are
considered physically
rather than in terms
of psychological
interests of others.
Confusion of authority's perspective
with one's own.

t.N
....

TABLE 1 (Cont'd.)
Level and Stage

What is Right

Reason for Doing Right

Social Perspective of
Stage

Stage 2 Individualism
Instrumental
Purpose and
Exchange

Following rules only when
it is to someone's
immediate interest; acting to meet one's own
interests and needs and
letting others do the
same. Right is also
what's fair, what's an
equal exchange, a deal,
an agreement.

To serve one's own needs
or interests in a world
where you have to recognize that other people
have their interests too.

Concrete individualistic perspective.
Aware that everybody has his own
interest to pursue
and these conflict,
so that right is
relative (in the
concrete individualistic sense).

LEVEL II CONVENTIONAL
Stage 3 - Mutual
Interpersonal
Expectations,
Relationships,
and Interpersonal
Conformity

Living up to what is
expected by people close
to you or what people
generally expect of
people in your role as
son, brother, friend,
etc. "Being good" is
important and means
having good motives,
showing concern about
others. It also
means keeping mutual
relationships, such as
trust, loyalty, respect
and gratitude.

The need to be a good person
in your own eyes and those
of others. Your caring for
others. Belief in the
Golden Rule. Desire to maintain rules and authority
which support stereotypical
good behavior.

Perspective of the
individual in
relationships with
other individuals.
Aware of shared
feelings, agreements,
and expectations
which take primacy
over individual
interests. Relates
points of view
through the concrete
Golden Rule, putting
yourself in the
other guy's shoes
Does not yet conVl
sider generalized
IJ1

TABLE 1 (Cont'd.)
Level and Stage

What is Right

Reason for Doing Right

Social Perspective of
Stage
system perspective

Stage 4 - Social
System and
Conscience

Fulfilling the actual
duties to which you
have agreed. Laws
are to be upheld
except in extreme
cases where they
conflict with other
fixed social duties.
Right is also contributing to society,
the group, or
institution.

To keep the institution
going as a whole, to avoid
the breakdown in the
system "if everyone did
it," or the imperative of
conscience to meet one's
defined obligations.
(Easily confused with
Stage three belief in
rules and authority.)

Differentiates
societal point of
view from interpersonal agreement
of motives. Takes
the point of view of
the system that
defines roles and
rules. Considers
individual relations
in terms of place in
the system.

LEVEL III - POSTCONVENTIONAL, or
PRINCIPLES
Stage 5-Social
Contract or Utility
and Individual Rights

Being aware that
people hold a variety
of values and
·
opinions, that most
values and rules are
relative to your
group. These
relative rules should
usually be upheld, in
the interest of impartiality and because
they are the social
contract. Some non-

A sense of obligation to
law because of one's social
contract to make and abide
by laws for the welfare of
all and for the protection of
all people's rights. A feeling of contractual commitment,
freely entered upon, to family,
friendship, trust, and work
obligations. Concern that
laws and duties be based on
rational calculation of overall
utility, "the greatest good for

Prior-to-society
perspective.
Perspective of a
rational individual
aware of values and
rights prior to social
attachments and contracts. Integrates
perspectives by formal
mechanisms of agreement, contract,
object impartiality
(J,l
and due process.
0\

TABLE 1 (Cont'd.)
Level and Stage

Stage 6-Universal
Ethical Principles

What is Right

Reason for Doing Right

Social Perspective of
Stage

relative values and
rights like life and
liberty, however, must
be upheld in any
society and regardless of majority
opinion

the greatest number,''

Considers moral and
legal points of view;
recognizes that they
sometimes conflict
and finds it
difficult to integrate
them.
·

Following self-chosen
ethical principles.
Particular laws or
social agreements are
usually valid because
they rest on such
principles. When laws
violate these principles, one acts in
accordance with the
principle. Principles
are universal principles of justice; the
equality of human rights
and respect for the
dignity of human beings
as individual persons.

The belief as a rational
person in the validity of
universal moral principles~
and a sense of personal
commitment to them.

Perspective of a moral
point of view from
which social arrangements derive.
Perspective is that
of any rational
individual recognizing
the nature of morality
or the fact that
persons are ends in
themselves and must be
treated as such.

(Sources:

Kohlberg and Turiel 1971;
Kohlberg 1976).
Vl

"
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in which attainment of an advanced stage is dependent on
the attainment of each of the preceding stages. It is
further assumed that a more advanced stage is not simply
an addition to a less advanced stage, but represents a
reorganization of less advanced stages (p. 226).
Kohlberg (1971), consistent with stage theory, states that the
stages are universal and culture free.

He writes:

A stage concept implies universality of sequence under varying
cultural conditions. It implies that moral development is not
merely a matter of learning the verbal values or rules of the
child's culture, but reflects something more universal in
development, something which would occur in any culture
(p. 171).

.

The sequence of stages does not appear to be dependent on
religious beliefs or lack of them.

Kohlberg and Turiel (1971) state:

No significant differences appear in the development of moral
thinking among Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Buddhists,
Moslems, and Atheists. Children's moral values in the
religious area seem to go through the same stages as their
general moral values (p. 438).
Stages generalize over a field of responses (Kohlberg, 1970;
Kohl berg and Mayer, 1972), i.e. behavior at a specific stage is truly
learned and not forgotten in contrast to responses artificially
taught, which are soon forgotten or unlearned.
The attainment of a given Piagetian cognitive stage is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for the parallel moral reasoning
stage.

Kohlberg (1975) enunciates the necessary cognitive develop-

mental stages in relation to his stages of moral development.

Piaget's

concrete operational stage is a prerequisite for the preconventional
level, stages one and two.

The cognitive stage of concrete operations

plus a partial formal operational stage is required for the conventional level of moral reasoning, stages three and four.

Full formal

operational cognitive reasoning is prerequisite for the principled
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level of moral development, stages five and six.

Most persons

appear to be higher in cognitive development than in moral development.
Kohlberg

(1~75)

gives the following example;

Over fifty percent of late adolescents and adults are capable
of full formal reasoning, but only ten percent of these adults
(all formal operation~!) display principled (stages 5 and 6)
moral reasoning (p. 671).
Loevinger (1975) states that Kohlberg views cognitive development as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the corresponding
stage of Loevinger's ego development, which, in turn, is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for the corresponding stage of moral
development (Kohlberg, 1976).

Loevinger's formula is that moral

development, interpersonal development, development of self concept,
and inner life proceed together as a single integrated structure.
Loevinger (1975) states, "I believe that in measuring ego development,
I am measuring moral development" (p. 63).

Loevinger has sketched out

the course of healthy ego development into a sequence of seven stages
that are not age specific, namely;

(1)

Presocial and symbiotic; (2)

Impulse ridden; (3) Opportunistic; (4) Conformist; (5) Conscientious;
(6) Autonomous; and (7) Integrated.

It would seem that Loevinger's

stages of ego development and Kohlberg's stages of moral development
are not mutually exclusive.

Table 2 shows a possible correspondence of

Loevinger's and Kohlberg's stages (after Loevinger, 1976).

Kohlberg

(1976) granting that a high correlation is suggested between measures of
ego development and measures of moral development states:
... such a correlation does not imply that moral development can
be defined simply as a division or area of ego development ... A
broad psychological cognitive-developmental theory of moralization is an ego developmental theory ... To see moral stages as
simply reflections of ego level, however, is to lose the
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TABLE 2
CORRESPONDENCE OF LOEVINGER'S- AND KOHLBERG'S. STAGES

Loevinger's
Ego Stages

Kohlberg' s
Noral Stages

Stage 1

Presocial -

- - Stage 0

Premoral Stage

Stage 2

Impulsive -

- Stage 1

Punishment and
Obedience

Transition Stage Self Protective
Stage 3

Conformist

Stage 2

- - - - - - Stage 3

Transition Stage 3/4 Conscientious
Conformist - Stage 4
Stage 4

Conscientious - - - - - Stage 5

Naive Instrumental
Hedonism
Interpersonal
Conformity
Law and Order
,,
Social Contract

Transitional Stage 4/5 Individualistic
Universal Ethical
Principles

Stage 5

Autonomous

- - - - - - Stage 6

Stage 6

Integrated

- - - - - - (Proposed Stage 7)
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ability to theoretically define and empirically find order in
the specifically moral domain of the human personality
(p. 53).

For Kohlberg, advancement in moral reasoning occurs through the
stimulation of moral conflict at a level of one stage aboye the existing stage (Kohl berg and Turiel, 1971; Kohl berg and Mayer, 1972).
Kohlberg and Turiel (1971) state that to stimulate change to a higher
stage, three assumptions must be taken into consideration:

(1)

Children do not comprehend reasoning more than one stage above their
own; (2) Children should be helped to advance one stage higher by
inducing moral conflicts; in doing this the children should be helped
to understand the higher stage of reasoning; (3) Spontaneous use of
the higher form of reasoning should be provided for children so that
they can be helped to accept the higher form in new situations.
Kohlberg (1970) states:
Our Platonic view holds that if we inspire cognitive conflict
in the student and point the way to the next step up the
divided line, he will tend to see things previously invisible
to him (p. 82).
A series of applications based on Kohlberg's model have been
used in correctional settings (Kohlberg, Scharf, and Hickey, 1972;
Kohlberg, Kauffman, Scharf, and Hickey, 1973).

These have led to the

concept of the "just community" in which rules are made and conflicts
resolved through the discussion of fairness and a democratic vote.
Such a program has been in operation since 197'1 and has stimulated
moral reasoning advances in inmates.

The "just community" program

which aims at a stage five level of moral reasoning is also being used
in several high schools in the United States.

Reasonable rules are

used as vehicles for moral discussion with the hope that a sense of
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community will lead to behavior changes of a positive nature.
Kohlberg (1975) is quick to point out that the societal moral
atmosphere of the home, school, and society in general, must be considered when one considers the conditions that stimulate moral growth.
Verbal I.Q. scores and mental age reflect a certain level of
intellectual maturity and are a prerequisite for moral development
since moral issues must be first understood before moral judgments
can be made.

However, Kohlberg (1969) states that I.Q. scores are

poor predictors of maturity of moral judgment, the correlation
between verbal I.Q. and maturity of moral judgment being in the 30s.
Research Supporting Kohlberg's Cognitive Developmental Interpretation
of Moral Development
Research concerning Piaget's model of moral development will not
be reviewed since the major emphasis of this section has focused on
Kohlberg and his theory of moral development.

Bronfenbrenner (1969)

and Lickona (1976) give succinct surveys of research concerning
Piaget's model of moral development to which the reader is referred.
Turiel (1975) reports tentative results of a continuing longitudinal study relating to the development of social concepts.

A social

conventional interview and a moral judgment interview were obtained
from approximately 175 males and females between the ages of nine and
thirty years of age.
intervals.

Subjects were reinterviewed at two or three year

The research focused on the distinction between social

conventional thinking and moral judgment.

Turiel notes that previous

explanations of social development either have treated social and moral
concepts alike or have subordinated all social concepts to moral
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reasoning.

The results, so far obtained, have reported that moral

judgments and social conventional thinking are not reducible to each
other; morals and mores were found not to be the same.
'Keasey (1975) investigated the relationship between Piaget's
cognitive developmental stages and Kohlberg's moral developmental
stages.

Using twelve and nineteen year old girls as subjects, Keasey

investigated the relationship between principled moral reasoning and
the formal operational stage of cognitive development.

The results

showed that some of the subjects had formal operational thinking but
not principled moral reasoning.

However, there was no case of a

person reasoning at the principled level of moral judgment that did
not show evidence of a substantial amount of formal operational thinking.

One of Keasey's conclusions was that formal operational thinking

is a necessary but not sufficient condition for principled moral
reasoning.

In a second study, Keasey (1975) examined the relationship

between concrete operational thinking and stage two of moral
reasoning, utilizing seven and nine year old boys and girls as
subjects.

Results indicated that concrete operational thinking was a

necessary but not sufficient condition for stage two moral reasoning.
Kohlberg (1968) reported data concerning cross cultural studies
of moral reasoning in children from America, Taiwan, Mexico, Turkey,
and Yucatan.

These data suggest that the stages of moral reasoning

are universal and not purely an American construct, even though initial
evidence shows that the principled level is not often attained iri
primitive or preliterate societies.
Turiel (1966) utilizing forty-four middle class boys, ages twelve
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and thirteen, tested the hypotheses that Kohlberg's stages form an
invariant sequence and that each stage represents a reorganization and
displacement of the preceding stage.

In terms of the invariance of

the sequence of stages, Turiel felt that the hypothesis was confirmed
even though the results only reached a borderline level of significance.

In terms of the second hypothesis the results were said to be

only suggestive, since significant findings were minimal.
Holstein (1976) in a longitudinal study investigated Kohlberg's
assumptions regarding the sequential invariance and the irreversibility of the stages.

Middle class adolescents and adults were

observed over a three year period as to their individual developmental
sequences.

Results supported sequential invariance but only in the

movement from level to level rather than from stage to stage; and the
sequential invariance was noted only for the first two levels of
Kohlberg's three level model.
found for the higher stages.

As to irreversibility, regression was
Kuhn (1976) reported results of

sequentiality of the lower stages.

Five to eight year old subjects

showed significant progressive change, most of which consisted of
slight advancement toward the next stage, after one year.

White,

Bushnell, and Regnemer (1978) reported that their three year longitudinal and cross sectional investigation of moral development in
Bahamian school children, ages 8 to 17, showed a general upward stage
movement within and between groups.

However, not one of the subjects

reasoned beyond stage three.
Several studies have investigated the relationship between a
specific stage and various overt behaviors.

R. L. Krebs (1971) found
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that seventy-five percent of his adolescent subjects at stage four
and below cheated on at least one of four experimental cheating tests
while only twenty percent of the stage five youngsters cheated.

The

results of Brown et al (1969) were similar using college students as
subjects.

Almost fifty percent of the conventional level students

cheated as compared to eleven percent of the principled level
students.

Milgram (1963) utilized college subjects who were told to

inflict punishment to a student by increasing the severity of electric
shock.

The "victim" (an associate of the experimenter) had

voluntarily agreed to participate in the learning experiment, and the
subjects had made a contractual commitment to perform the experiment.
Results showed that the majority of the students obeyed and continued
to shock the "victim" to the danger point.

Stage five students

obeyed and conformed to the demands of the experimenter since they had
entered into a contract agreement and the "victim" had freely
sented.

con-

Only stage six students clearly defined the situation as one

in which the experimenter did not have the moral right to ask the
subjects to inflict pain on another person.

Seventy-five percent of

the stage six subjects refused or quit shocking the "victim", while
only thirteen percent of all the subjects at lower levels did so.
Haan

(~971)

used the real life situation of the 1964 Berkeley civil

disobedience by students who staged a sit-in at the administration
building of the University of California to preserve the rights of
political free speech on the campus.

The administrators held a stage

five position, namely, a student came to the university voluntarily,
knowing the rules, and could go elsewhere if he did not wish to
comply since he had entered into a social contract.

The issue for the
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students was the willingness to violate authority for the sake of
civil rights.

It was found that only the stage six moral reasoning

students clearly defined civil disobedience as just.
reasoning did not lead to a clear decision.

Stage five

Stage three and four

students viewed such an action as a violation of authority.

Stage two

students were concerned with their own rights in a conflict of power.
Eighty percent of the stage six, fifty percent of the stage five, ten
percent of the stage three and four students participated in the act
of civil disobedience.

However, over fifty percent of the stage two

students participated.

This unexpected result was accounted for by

the model of moral reasoning that differentiated the stage six students
from the stage two students.

Stage six students reasoned in terms of

justice; stage two students reasoned in terms of self rights in a conflict of power.
Freundlich and Kohlberg (1971) found that eighty-three percent
of their sample of fifteen to seventeen year old delinquents from
working class homes were at the preconventional level of moral reasoning while only twenty percent of non-delinquent subjects were preconventional.
Kohlberg, LaCross, and Ricks (1970) investigating the recidivist
adolescent delinquent, state that such a youngster is not only at the
preconventional level, but is likely to come from a delinquency prone
neighborhood and from a family with severe problems.

The authors

state that in order to understand delinquency, sociological and
psychological factors beyond immature moral judgments need to be
considered.
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Blatt (1971) conducted a series of studies investi$ating advancement in moral reasoning using Kohlberg's concepts.

Subjects were

eleven and twelve year old Sunday School children.

Discussion of moral

dilemmas was held once a week for a three month period.

Results showed

that a significant number of children advanced almost one full stage
and that this advancement in moral reasoning remained advanced one year
later.

A replication of the procedure was made in a public school

setting with a class of black and a class of white
eleven and fifteen years.
discussion

children, ages

Control groups were children who had no

sessions, and children who discussed moral dilemmas on their

own without having a trained discussion leader.

Although advancement in

moral reasoning was not as great as in the first study, the increase on
the experimental group ranged from one quarter to one half stage.
Summary of Research Supporting Kohlberg's Cognitive Developmental View of Moral Development:

The review of research addressed it-

self to five areas of Kohlberg's cognitive developmental interpretation of moral development:

(1) Comparison of social conventional

thinking and moral judgment; (2) The relationship of a given stage of
Piaget's cognitive development to a given stage of moral development;
(3) Characteristic properties of the stages; (4) The relationship of
the stages of moral reasoning to specific overt behaviors; (5) Advancement in

moral development.

One researcher investigated the distinction between morals and
mores.

Results showed that moral judgments are not reducible to

social conventional thinking (Turiel, 1975).
The relationship of a given stage of cognitive development to a
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given stage of moral reasoning was investigated by Keasey (1975).
His findings showed that a formal operational stage of thinking is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for principled moral reasoning;
and a concrete opeTational stage of thinking is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for stage two moral reasoning.
Several studies focused on the characteristic properties of the
stages of moral reasoning.

Only borderline results were obtained

for sequential invariance of the stages (Turiel, 1966), but there was
some evidence of sequential invariance in movement from level to level
for Kohlberg's first two levels (Holstein, 1976, Kuhn, 1976).

Minimal

findings were obtained for the assumption that a higher stage
represents a reorganization and displacement of the preceding stage
(Turiel, 1966).

As for the assumption of the irreversibility of the

stages, this assumption was upheld for the lower stages (Holstein,
1976; White et al, 1978) but regression was found for the higher
stages (Holstein, 1976).
A few studies investigated the relationship of a particular
stage to specific overt behaviors"

Students who were at the principled

stage of moral reasoning cheated very rarely while persons below the
principled stage generally cheated (Brown, 1969; Krebs, 1971).

In an

investigation where the subjects entered into a contract to inflict
pain (electric shock) on a volunteering "victim", only stage six
subjects concluded that the experimenter had no moral right to
inflict pain on another person regardless of the conditions
(Milgram, 1963).

Civil disobedience in terms of sitting-in at a

university's administration center to preserve the rights of political
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free speech was engaged in basically by stage six and stage two
persons.

What differentiated the two groups was their mode of moral

reasoning (Haan, 1971).

Two studies investigated the stage of moral

reasoning of adolescent delinquents.

Even though the authors state

that other factors in addition to moral reasoning must be considered
in studying delinquency, the majority of adolescent delinquents were
;·

found to be at the preconventional level of moral reasoning (Kohlberg,
LaCross, and Ricks, 1970; Freundlich and Kohlberg, 1971).
Weekly discussion of moral dilemmas in a Sunday school class
under a trained leader showed that a significant number of children
advanced almost one full stage and the advanced moral reasoning was
present a year later.

However, a replication using public school

children did not show as much moral reasoning advancement (Blatt, 1971).
The distinction between morals and mores in the Turiel (1975)
study gives initial support to Kohlberg's distinction between moral
principles and societal rules.

Kohlberg's conventional level of moral

development can be reduced to social conventional thinking,. which
according to Kohlberg's description is just that.

However, it is a

level through which a person must pass in order to advance to the
principled level of moral reasoning.
The work of Keasey (1975) partially confirms Kohlberg's contentions regarding the relationship between Piaget's stages of cognitive
development and the stages of moral development.

However, Kohlberg

requires full formal operational thinking for principled moral reasoning.

Some of Keasey's subjects who reasoned at the principled level

were not fully formal operational in cognitive thinking.
Kurtines and Grief (1974) criticize Kohlberg's cross cultural data

so
in that the studies have never been published for fellow scientists to
scrutinize.

Quantative infonnation concerning sample size, actual

scores, range and standard deviation of scores are not reported, and
no description is given of the method used to determine stages of
moral development.

Simpson (1974) faults Kohlberg's cross cultural

data in respect to the limited scope of the data, difficulty in using
moral dilemma and verbal interview techniques demanding mode of
thought and language not valued or developed in many cultures, and
limitations of the use of value categories that may not reflect the
categories of the culture being studied.
Only minimal support is had for the invariant sequentiality of
the stages with the inferred assumption that a higher stage is a reorganization of the preceding stage, and for the assumption that the
stages are irreversible.

Sequential invariance has been found for the

lower stages (Kuhn, 1976) and lower levels (Holstein, 1976); reversibility was found in the higher stages (Holstein, 1976).

Keasey

(1975) states that the issue of sequential invariance has been fairly
resolved.

However, many would argue that such a resolution of the

issue has not been attained.

It would appear that a resolution of the

issue would require longitudinal studies following children from the
initiaL stage of moral reasoning through adulthood.
Kohlberg's contention that the only thing moral about moral
behavior is the moral judgment, receives support from the Haan (1971)
study, whereby the factor that differentiated stage six and stage two
students, engaged in the same overt action, was their stage of moral
reasoning.
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Another assumption of Kohlberg is that behavior at a specific
stage is truly learned and not forgotten.

This may \vell be true, but

what is learned is not necessarily performed.

The issue of moral

reasoning leading to moral action has not been sufficiently addressed
by Kohlberg and his associates.

As f-.1ischel and Mischel (1976) have

stated, a comprehensive model of moral development must take into
account both moral reasoning and moral behavior.

Kurtines and Grief

(1974) raise questions concerning the arbitrary nature of the stages,
the difficulty of comparing studies since different dilemmas have
been used, the changes Kohlberg has made in his measuring instrument,
and the reliability of the moral dilemma test.

These questions

should not be ignored but should be answered by Kohlberg and his
colleagues.
Kohlberg (1975) responded to criticisms at the biannual convention of the Society for Research in Child Development.

However, his

remarks are unpublished and a personal communication from The Center
for Moral Education, Harvard University, reported that his talk was unavailable.
Recent research by Napier (1976) has shown that teachers are unable to stage score moral reasoning statements lvi th an adequate degree
of correctness by using Kohlberg's global rating manual and self training.

Kohlberg and Fenton (1977) have prepared an audio visual workshop

for the training of teachers.

This workshop prescinds from the

teachers' ability to classify student responses one stage above their
present level.

(Rest, 1974, has questioned the ability of teachers to

respond to students' responses at a +1 stage).

This is disturbing
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since the Kohlbergian literature concerning advancement in moral
reasoning stresses that advancement is dependent on the stimulation
of moral conflict at a level of one stage above the existing stage
(Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971; Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972; Kohlberg,
1972; Kohlberg, 1975; Fenton, 1976).

An explanation would seem in

order concerning these omissions in the training program for teachers.
A special focus for research would appear to be the characteristic attributes of the stages (university, sequential invariance
irreversibility); most studies have been cross cultural with the
exception of Turiel's (1975), Holstein's (1976), Kuhn's (1976),
White's et al (1978) and Kohlberg's \vork.

Longitudinal studies are

needed and such studies may well answer many of the questions that have
been raised in this section.

Finally, Kohlberg's cognitive develop-

mental view of moral development must address itself.to the transition
from moral reasoning to moral performance.
Hogan's Characterological Interpretation of

~·!oral

Development

Hogan (1973, 1975) espouses a developmental interpretation of
moral development in that he subscribes to definable end points to
development which are preceded by qualitative changes over time.
Human development is viewed as an interaction between the human
organism and the environment.

However, Hogan's characterological

developmental approach is a major departure from Kohlberg's interpretation in that he does not accept sequentially invariant and hierarchically arranged stages.
Brown (1965) proposes that social psychologists be characterized
by the set of problems on which they concentrate.

Hogan (1975)
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conceives of Brown's

vic\~oint

as perhaps the most critical problem

facing psychologists studying moral development, in that, research
and theory in moral development must be grounded in a broader conceptua.lization of social action.

Hogan conceives of the study of

moral development as integrated within the larger theoretical context
of personality theory.

Such theory addresses itself to questions of

in what way are people alike, in what way are they different, and
what is the meaning of specific anomalous behavior?

Hogan conceives

of the commonality among persons as anchored in motivation and
development.

In terms of motivation, Hogan (1975) sees human beings

as simultaneously "attention seeking and rule following animals
(p. 154).

11

Development is discussed in the context of two semantic

aspects of personality, namely, role structure and character
structure.

Role structure is seen as the mode of action in social

situations.

Character structure consists of the inner, unconscious,

deep, stable, and enduring dispositions that define a person as he
truly is.

Role structure is said to be a function of cultural-social

determinants.

Character structure is seen as resulting from the

organism accomodating to familial, cultural-social, ethnic, and
religious environment.

Role structure and character structure taken

together comprise the individual's personality.
is inferred from overt attitude statements.

Character structure

The most important

attitudes are those that a person develops in regard to the conventional rules and percepts of his culture.
Moral conduct is said to be essentially social conduct.

Manners

and morals are indistinguishable so that moral action is not distinct
from ordinary social conduct.

Hogan (1973) defines moral conduct as:
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... actions carried out with regard to the rules that apply
in a given social context ... In the final analysis, moral
behavior typically comes .down to either following or disregarding a social rule of some sort; consequently a major
problem for the psychology of moral conduct is to account
for social compliance or noncompliance (p. 219).
For Hogan, moral action is understood primarily within the context of character structure, i.e. in not what a person does, but in
his reasons for doing it, characterized by the recurring motives and
dispositions giving stability and coherence to social conduct.

He

undertakes to describe the dimensions along which character structure
seems to vary among persons in terms of five personality variables,
which are conceptually independent and seem to characterize how people
differ in their use of rules.

He writes:

... these concepts are abstract dimensions of individual
differences in nomotic (rule-governed) behavior, and as such,
they should help explain moral conduct in any socio-cultural
context (1973, p. 220).
The five dimensions of character structure are:

(1) moral knowledge;

(2) ethics of conscience-ethics of social responsibility continuum;
(3) socialization; (4) empathy; and (5) autonomy.

These dimensions

are said to explain a considerable range of moral behavior and define
important parameters of character development.
Moral knowledge is the base from which a person is able to make
moral judgments.

It involves the knowledge of social rules and has

been associated with intelligence.

Referring to Maller (1944) Hogan

states that tests of moral knowledge and intelligence tests are
functionally equivalent.
The second dimension of character structure is the ethics of
conscience-ethics of social responsibility continuum, called by Hogan
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(1975) the moral intuitionism - moral positivism continuum.

Ethics of

conscience is based on the assumption that there are higher laws unrelated to human legislation, i.e. natural laws, which may be
discovered by reason and intuition.
correspond to natural law.

Human laws are just, only if they

The underlying attitudes of the ethics of

personal conscience resemble the natural law morality of Thomas
Aquinas.

Ethics of social responsibility is based on the denial of

natural law.

Human laws are justified in terms of their instrumental

value in promoting the general welfare of society and are based in
utilitarianism and positivism.

Hogan (1973) does not view these two

dimensions of character structure (i.e. moral knowledge, and the
ethics of conscience - ethics of responsibility continuum) as developmental in the sense of having definable transition points which are
preceded by qualitative changes over time.

However, the three

dimensions of socialization, empathy, and autonomy are viewed as
developmental in nature and are said to be ·critical for mature moral
development in the "normal" person.

Hogan (1973) views these

variables as major transition points in moral development occuring at
progressively later points in time.

He writes:

... once attained, these capacities bring about qualitative
changes in the underlying structure of moral conduct ... In
this model, however, attainment of the later "stages" is not
dependent on successful transition through the earlier levels.
Rather, all three stages are distinct developmental
challenges whose outcome defines each person's unique character
structure (pp. 230-231).
In contrast to Freud, Hogan (1973) believes that the child is social by
nature.

He states:
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Thus rather than ask what must be done to the child to fit
him into society, it may.be more important to ask what must
be done in order to drive him out (p. 221).
Hogan views the socialization process as being basically completed by
the time the child enters school.

The internalization of ·social rules

brings about a qualitative transformation in character structure.
Without further developmental changes, socialization produces what
Hogan calls a characterological syndrome exemplified by the tendency
to act as if rules are sacred and unchangeable and valuable for their
mvn sake, the moral realism stage of Piaget (1932).

Empathy, the fourth dimension of character structure, is viewed
as an innate capacity which is facilitated by parental practices,
but elicited by interaction with the social environment.

Hogan v1ews

the development of empathy as a product of peer group experience and
the child's attempt to accomodate himself to an expanded set of social
norms.

Hogan believes that the development of empathy is probably

completed by late adolescence.

The development of empathy brings

about a transformation in character structure.

In persons low in

socialization, empathy is said to serve as a compensatory incentive for
prosocial behavior; in persons high in socialization, empathy serves
to temper and humanize their moral realism.
Socialization and empathy are committed to the status quo, while
autonomy gives the capacity for prosocial non-compliance and is the
source of constructive social change.

The development of an autonomous

sense of obligation produces a final transformation in character
structure, and is said not to fully develop until a person leaves his
peer group.

Hogan (1975) writes:
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In conjunction with high socialization and high empathy,
autonomy produces moral maturity~ a statistical rare
character type. In conjunction with high socialization
and low empathy_, autonomy tends to produce a stern,
patriarchal .. old testament moralist ... In conjunction with
low empathy and low socialization, autonomy tends to produce
strong, effective, resolute, unyielding scoundrels (p. 163).
Research Supporting Hogan's Characterological Interpretation of
Moral Development
Hogan has specified the instruments for measuring the five
dimensions of character structure.

However, these measuring instru-

ments require fairly sophisticated levels of development, and consequently should be used only with adolescents and

adults~

and are not

recommended for use with younger subjects.
Moral knowledge being functionally equivalent to intelligence is
measured by tests of general intelligence.

Hogan (1970) has developed

the Survey of Ethical Attitudes to measure the moral intuitionism moral positivism dimension of character structure.

This measure of

ethical attitudes is reported to be uncorrelated with intelligence
and Hogan (1970) reports that in two separate samples, the instrument
discriminated strongly between persons whose occupational choices
reflected a belief in law and established procedures such as policemen, and people who believed in civil disobedience as a means for
promoting social change.

Socialization and autonomy are measured by

the socialization (Gough, 1969), and autonomy scales (Kurtines, 1973)
of the California Personality Inventory.

An empathy scale has been

developed by Hogan (1969) which correlates between .30 and .50 with
several measures of intellectual performance, suggesting that there
seems to be some association between intelligence and empathy.
measure of empathy seemingly assesses empathy viewed as social

This
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cognition in contrast to empathy viewed as the vicarious sharing of
the affective state of another.
Hogan (1973, 1975) administered a fifteen sentence completion
type instrument to measure maturity of moral judgment using college
subjects who were required to respond quickly and briefly to such
items as:

"The police should be encouraged in their efforts to

apprehend and prosecute homosexuals.
foundations of society."

Homosexuality threatens the

Consistant with Hogan's departure from

Kohlberg's approach, the moral maturity test developed by Hogan and
Dickstein (1972) does not use stage prototypic statements.

The

results of the 1973 study showed positive correlations between mature
moral judgment and the personality variables of socialization (r=.40),
empathy (r=.58), and autonomy (r=.56).

In his 1975 paper Hogan

reports the same correlations for socialization and empathy in
relationship to mature moral judgment;

however, a negative correla-

tion (r=-.04) is reported between autonomy and mature moral judgment.
No mention is made in the 1975 paper regarding the positive correlation between autonomy and mature moral judgment in the earlier paper.
The explanation appears to lie in the instruments used for measuring
autonomy.

In the 1973 paper, autonomy was measured by an instrument

of independence developed by Barron (1953); however, in the 1975 paper,
Hogan advocates the use of the autonomy scale (Kurtines, 1973) of the
California Personality Inventory.

The use of two different measures

of autonomy seems to account for positive (Barron measure) and
negative (Kurtines measure) correlations between autonomy and mature
moral judgment.
In a recent study De Palma (1975) used the Defining Issues Test
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of Rest (1972) and Hogan's measure of empathy to investigate the
relation between principled moral reasoning and cognitive empathy.
Results showed that high principled subjects (P scores

~

48) were

likely to be high in empathy, while college subjects with lower
principled reasoning (P scores<:48) did not show any trends but were
equally dispersed.
Summary of Research Supporting Hogan's Characterological View of
Moral Development:

TI1e research supporting Hogan's view concern-

ing moral development is sparse due to the recency of his theory.
De Palma (1975) found that subjects who were high in principled moral
judgment on the Defining Issues Test, (Rest, 1972) were also high in
cognitive empathy.
Hogan (1973) reported positive correlations between mature moral
judgment and the variables of socialization, empathy, and autonomy.
Hogan's 1975 paper relates the same correlations for socialization and
empathy, but reports a negative correlation for the relationship
between autonomy and mature moral judgment.

The difference appears to

be due to the different measures used to assess autonomy.
The Moral Maturity Test, (Hogan and Dickstein, 1972) a fifteen
item sentence completion type instrument, must be questioned concerning
its reliability.

The test requires subjects to respond quickly and very

briefly to controversial statements.
valid

response~an

It is questionable whether a

be obtained due to space and time limitations.

Another issue that must be considered is the query, does the test
measure moral reasoning?

The Moral Maturity Test as well as Hogan's
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Survey of Ethical Attitudes require further research in order to more
firmly establish initial reliability and validity.
Hogan (1969) states, "Empathy refers only to the act of constructing for oneself another person's mental state" (p. 308).

His

empathy scale is said to correlate .30 to .SO with various measures of
intellectual performance.

Hogan views empathy as a purely cognitive

construct in contrast to Feshbach (1975), Feshbach and Roe (1968),
Hoffman (1977), and Stotland (1969) who view empathy not only as a
recognition of another's affect, but also as a person's vicarious
affective response to another person's feelings.

In measuring

empathy, Hogan appears to be measuring social intelligence.
Candee (1977) found that principled s_tage physician's were
distinguished from their lower stage colleagues by three dimensions,
one of which was their ability of placing themselves in the place of
their patients.

A typical statement made by the principled stage

physicians was, "I put myself emotionally in the patient's position
and try to understand what he is coping with."

Although Candee calls

this ability role taking, it is this emotional placing of oneself in
another's position that is called affective empathy in the present
investigation.
Kohlberg (1976) views role taking as a more comprehensive term
than empathy.

He states "when the emotional side of role taking is

stressed, it is typically termed empathy " (p. 49).

Hoffman (1977)

distinguishes between the cognitive awareness of another's emotional
state and the vicarious affective response to another person's
feelings.

The former is designated as affective perspective taking,

"or more simply, recognition of affect, since it pertains to the
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observer's cognitive interpretation of the other's emotional state.
The second concept pertains to ... what is commonly thought of as
empathy." (p. 712).
Feshbach (1975) stresses that empathy not only involves "the
capacity to understand, but also the capacity to feel." (p. 28).
Empathy is distinguished from social cognition in that the two are not
merely different aspects of the same cognitive process, but are
functionally distinct, even though, related variables.

While empathy

presupposes some degree of social cognition, the converse is not true.
"Understanding the feelings of another person does not necessarily
lead to an empathic response"

(p. 26).

The cognitive component of

empathy is important, but it is the affective component that gives
empathy its unique property.
Recapitulation
The work of Hartshorne, l\tay and their colleagues, psychoanalytic
theory, and the resurgence of behaviorism, inhibited research concerning moral development especially among American psychologists during
the first half of the twentieth century.

The Hartshorne and l\tay

studies (1928-1930) regarding cheating and honesty, (subjects being
children ages eleven to fourteen years) reported that honesty and
cheating·are situation specific and their findings showed little
evidence for unified character traits.
in moral behavior is non-existent.

They concluded that generality

Psychoanalytic theory claimed that

moral development was essentially completed by the age of five through
the process of the child's identification with the same sex parent.
Accordingly, study of moral development was not needed after that age.

62

Finally, the behavioristic revolution, \vith its emphasis on overt,
measurable behavior, had no place for such mentalistic constructs as
conscience and moral reasoning.
It was Piaget, the Swiss psychologist, who laid the foundation
for renewed interest in the study of moral development.

He hypoth-

esized three periods or stages in the moral development of the child,
based on a sense of justice.

Piaget suggests that as a child becomes

a member of a larger and more varied peer group, rules and moral
reasoning may become less absolute and authoritarian, and more
dependent on the desires and needs of the group.

Piaget laid the

groundwork for Kohlberg's contemporary interpretation of moral development.
The major focus of the preceding discussion of the literature
was on three contemporary interpretations of moral development:

(1)

Bandura's and Mischel's social learning interpretation of moral
development; (2) Kohlberg's cognitive developmental interpretation of
moral development; (3) Hogan's characterological interpretation of
moral development.
Bandura's and Mischel's Social Learning Interpretation of Moral
Development:

Moral behavior is learned through modeling and

reinforcement and continues throughout life with wide individual
differences, the primary determinant of moral behavior being the
person's environment.

There are no universal values and morality is

culturally relative.

Mischel and Mischel (1976) distinguish between a

person's competency to generate moral behavior and the actual performance of moral action.

The translation of moral competency into moral
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action in a specific situation depends on the person's expectation of
the consequences of the action and the subjective value that he
places on these expectancies. ·All moral action is said to depend on
the expected consequences, be they immediate and concrete or distant
and abstract and contingent upon the person achieving or violating
self standards.

Prolonged moral behavior requires self control and

covert symbolic acts such as self praise or self instruction can
mediate progress toward arduous goals.
Several studies have supported the relationship between prosocial behavior and imitation of the model (Bryan and Test, 1967;
Hain et al, 1956; Rosenbaum, 1956; Rosenhan and White, 1967; Staub,
1971; Test and Bryan, 1969; White, 1967).

The model's warmth

(nurturance) had no effect on subject's behavior (Grusec, and
Skubiski, 1970; Midlarsky and Bryan, 1967; Rosenhan and White, 1967).
Positive affective consequences experienced by the model and the
subjects' perceived similarity to the model were factors that influenced the subjects' behavior (Hornstein, Fisch, and Holmes, 1968;
Midlarsky and Bryan, 1972); verbal instruction coupled with priase,
justified exhortations, and actual demonstration by the model also
were shown to affect behavior (Bryan, 1971; Bryan and Schwartz, 1971;
Bryan

~.nd

Walbek, 1970; Midlarsky and Bryan, 1972; Walbek, 1969;

\fuite, 1967).

Conflicting results appeared to be obtained in studies

concerning the model's inconsistency in verbal and physical behavior
and the influence of the modeling on subjects (Bryan and Walbek, 1970;
Midlarsky and Bryan, 1972; Mischel and Liebert, 1966).

Seemingly

conflicting results were also obtained 1n studies investigating the
influence on children of a model yielding to temptation (Walters and
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Parke, 1964; Bryan and Stein, 1967; Stein, 1967).

Modeling exerted

significant influence in modifying children's moral judgments (Bandura
and McDonald, 1963; Cowan et al 1969).

Social learning research has

focused on overt behavior and individual differences.

Generally, such

research has not investigated behaviors at the principled level,
although Mischel's position seems to be promising.
Kohlberg's Cognitive Developmental Interpretation of Moral
Development:

While social learning researchers focus their

investigations on overt behavior, Kohlberg focuses his energies on
moral judgment which he contends is the only moral factor in "moral"
behavior.

Kohlberg incorporates his model within a frame\Wrk of three

levels and seven stages of moral development.

The stages are said to

be universal, sequentially invariant, hierarchical, and irreversible.
Accordingly, morals are universal while rules are relative.

Moral

development occurs as a result of maturation and the person's interaction with his environment.

Moral judgment is related to cognitive

and ego development in that they are necessary but not sufficient
conditions for moral reasoning.

Persons one stage higher exert the

greatest influence for moral reasoning advancement due to the moral
conflict that is induced.

Although Kohl berg vie\vs Loevinger' s stages

of ego development as necessary but not sufficient conditions for
moral judgment, Loevinger equates the seven stages of ego development
with stages of moral development.
Results of Turiel's study (1975) support Kohlberg's assumption
that morals are not reducible to mores.

Staub (1975) found that formal

operational thinking is prerequisite for principled moral reasoning, and
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concrete operational thinking is prerequisite for stage two moral
reasoning, thus partially supporting Kohlberg's contention.

The

sequential invariance and irreversibility of the stages have received
only minimal research support.

There appeared to be a trend toward

invariance in the first two levels (not stages) and regression was
found in the higher stages (Turiel, 1966; Holstein, 1976).

Research

concerning the relationship of the stages to overt behavior has shown
that principled level students rarely cheated (Brown, 1969; Krebs, 1971)
that stage six students were the only ones to conclude that no one has
the right to impose pain on another person (Milgram, 1963); that the
majority of the students that participated in the same action of civil
disobedience were either stage two or stage six in moral reasoning;
what differentiated the two groups were their level of moral judgment
(Haan, 1971).

Adolescent delinquents were found to be at a pre-

cenventional level of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, LaCross and Ricks,
1970; Freundlich and Kohlberg, 1971).

Children discussing moral

dilemmas with a trained leader who challenged them one stage higher
than the stage they possessed, showed stage advancement, while children
discussing the dilemmas without the leader showed no advancement
(Blatt, 1971).

In his focusing on moral judgment, Kohlberg addresses

himself to the commonality among people in that heredity determines the
sequent1al, invariant order of the stages, while the environment
affects the rate of development at each stage.
Hogan's Characterological Interpretation of Moral Development:
By rooting moral development research in personality theory, Hogan
addresses himself both to individual differences and alikeness among
persons.

Hogan contends that all people share a comnon set of motives
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in that they are rule following,. group living, and "attention seeking
animals."

Hogan suggests that people are also alike in the parameters

of personality development, i.e. in the development of cltaracter
structure and role structure which taken together comprise individual
personality.

Hogan accounts for individual differences in terms of

genetics and social experiences.

Rejecting sequential invariant,

hierarchical stages of moral development, Hogan views moral development as being essentially the development of character structure.
Hogan has concentrated on investigating the five dimensions that he
considers to be a part of character structure:

moral knowledge, ethics

of conscience - ethics of responsibility continuum, socialization,
empathy, and autonomy, the latter three being considered as developmental in nature in that they represent transition points followed by
qualitative changes.

Due to the recency of Hogan's theory, only

minimal research has been reported in the literature supporting it.
De Palma (1975) found that subjects who were h.igh on principled moral
reasoning were also high on the empathy variable.

Hogan (1973) reports

positive correlations between mature moral judgment and the variables
of socialization, empathy, and autonomy; however, in a 1975 paper, a
negative correlation was reported between autonomy and mature moral
judgment.

This discrepancy appeared to be due to the different

instruments Hogan used for measuring autonomy.
These three interpretations convey the tone of the current views
regarding moral development, with social learning focusing on individual
differences, Kohlberg focusing on the alikeness among persons, and Hogan
(rooting his interpretation in personality theory) focusing on both
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likeness and individual differences among persons.
Mischel (representative of social learning) puts major emphasis
on behavior, contending that moral development, bei_ng acquired as a
result of modeling and conditioning, is continuous throughout life with
wide individual differences; the environment is considered as the
primary determinant of moral development.

Kohlberg puts major

emphasis on moral reasoning, contending that morality proceeds as an
ongoing process into adulthood in sequentially invariant, hierarchical,
and universal stages (related to cognitive and _ego development).

He

states that only a minority of adults arrive at the principled level
which is usually reached only after the age of twenty.

Heredity

determines the fixed order of stages while the environment affects the
rate of development at each stage.

Hogan views character structure

with its five dimensions as his point of major emphasis.

Morality

proceeds in "stages"" (neither sequentially invariant nor hierarchica 1)
of socialization, empathy, and autonomy; the attainment of the later
"stages" being independent of successful transition through the earlier
levels, all three "stages" being distinct developmental challenges.
Morality is an ongoing process into adulthood, with mature morality
being a rare statistic; environment is the primary determinant of moral
develop~ent,

while heredity gives universal human motives and the

construct of character structure.

Mischel and Hogan view morality as

culturally relative so that morals are equal to mores; in contrast,
Kohlberg contends that moral values and the stages of moral development
are universal so that morals are not reducible to mores.

Mischel,

Kohlberg, and Hogan all agree on the importance of moral reasoning in
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the psychol_ogical analysis of moral development.
Catania (1973) analyzing structural and functional psychology
states that various areas in psychology complement rather than conflict \vith each other; he opts that controversy "may give way to more
productive interactionsn (p. 440).

The present study attempted to

conceptually integrate Kohlberg's and Hogan's interpretations of moral
development, by investigating the relationship of stages of moral
reasoning with the personality variables of socialization, empathy,
and autonomy with one major departure; empathy as defined by

~ogan

(1969) refers to cognitive empathy (akin to social intelligence);
empathy as defined in the present study refers to affective empathy,
the vicarious sharing of another's feelings at least at the gross
le'vel.

CHAPTER III
METHOD
Hypotheses
The present investigation tested the following null hypotheses:
(1)

The assessed personality variables of socialization,

(assessed by the social standards subscale of the California Test of
Personality, Thorpe et al, 1953), autonomy, (assessed by the self
reliance subscale of the California Test of Personality), and empathy,
(assessed by a modified scale of empathy based on Mehrabian and
Epstein, 1972) will not be significantly related to levels of assessed
moral reasoning for the seventh grade sample (assessed by Carroll's
Test, 1974), and the college sample (assessed by the Defining Issues
Test, Rest, 1972).
(2)

The relationship of each of the personality variables of

socialization, autonomy, and empathy with the assessed dominant stage
of moral reasoning will not be significantly different at different
ages, namely, the seventh grade and college ages.
(3)

There will not be significant sex differences in socializa-

tion, a1,1tonomy, empathy, and the dominant stage of moral reasoning for
either the seventh grade or the college samples.
Subjects
One hundred seventh grade students were randomly selected from a
total population of 189 seventh grade students in a blue collar middle
class public school located in suburban Chicago.
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Two special education
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classes were excluded from the sample.
eliminated due to incomplete

responses~

Since two subjects were
and six students were absent

when testing occurred, the final seventh grade sample included 92
Caucasian students, 43 males and 49 females.
ducted during a two week period in May, 1977.

All testi_ng \vas conScience Research

Associates (S.R.A.) educational ability (I.Q.) and achievement scores
were available for all subjects.

The mean population I.Q. was 102.40,

standard deviation being 13.11, with a range from 68 to 140.

The mean

sample I.Q. was 102.37, standard deviation being 12.86 with a

r~nge

from 68 to 137.

The population was somewhat below national norms in

achievement, mean achievement scores being at the 44th percentile.
In addition, one hundred and nine Caucasian junior college freshmen and sophomore students, attending a middle class junior college
located in suburban Chicago, were tested during a three week period in
June, 1977.

Since four test protocols were incomplete and nine were

of questionable reliability, the final college sample included 96
Caucasian students, 43 males and 53 females, enrolled in an Introductory Psychology or a Child Psychology course.

The students were

informed by their instructor when the research testing would take
place and they were given the option of not attending the testing
session.

All the students in the classes selected for testing chose to

participate.
Procedure
Seventh Grade Sample:

For testing purposes, the seventh grade

sample was divided into four groups, each group containing 23 students.
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Two class periods of forty minutes each were allocated for each group;

during the first period, the·Carroll Test (1974) measuring level of
moral reasoning was administered; during the second period, the
instruments measuring socialization, autonomy, and empathy were
administered.
In order to control for reading ability, the instruments were
administered both visually and auditorily, the examiner reading aloud
the items while the subjects followed a written copy.

The students

were required to record their responses on two answer sheets, one used
for responses measuring levels of moral reasoning, and the other used
for responses measuring socialization, autonomy, and empathy (refer to
appendix A).
The following directions suggested by Carroll (1977) were used:
I am going to ask you to think about four situations where
individuals have to make difficult decisions. You are to read
along as I read the situation to you. You may agree or disagree with the advice given, but that is not your main task ...
Rather, you are asked to decide whether the reasons that are
given are good enough reasons for making such an important
decision ... Remember, the most important task is to decide
whether the reasons are good enough reasons for making such an
important decision.
The following directions were added by the

examiner~

After a situation is read, you are to use the answer sheet and
circle "yes" or "no". For instance, the first situation is
about Heinz who has to make a decision about stealing a drug that
might help his dying wife, since the druggist wanted ten times
the amount it cost him and Heinz did not have the money. If you
think Heinz should steal the drug, circle nyes"; if you think that
Heinz should not steal the drug, circle "no". After each
situation, there will be ten advice statements, forty in all,
as you can see on your answer sheet. For each advice statement
you are to mark it 1,2,3, or 4. If you accept the reason because
it is good enough for making this important decision, you put
down number 1; if you do not fully accept the reason but tend to
accept it because it seems to be a good enough reason for making
this important decision, put down number 2; if you tend to reject
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the reason because it does not seem to be a good enough reason
for making this important decision, put dmm number 3; if you
reject the reason because it is not a good enbugh reason for
making this important decision, put down number 4. Remember, if
you fully accept the reason, write a number 1; if you tend to
accept the reason, write a number 2; if you tend to reject the
reason, write a number 3; if you fully reject the reason,
write a number 4. (after Carroll, 1977).
The following was written on the blackboard:

1 = fully accept; 2 =

tend to accept; 3 = tend to reject; 4 = fully reject.
Empathy was assessed utilizing a four point scale similar to the
Carroll Test.

If the subject strongly agreed with a statement he was

instructed to answer with a 1; if he tended to agree, he was to
answer with a 2; if he tended to disagree, he was to answer with a 3;
if he strongly disagreed, he was to answer with a 4.

The measures of

socialization and autonomy required a "yes - no" response that was to be
written on the answer sheet.

Addresses of the students were available

for possible follow up studies.
College Sample:

Ninety minutes were allocated for each college

group during which a battery of tests was administered to assess level
of moral reasoning, socialization, autonomy, and empathy.

Unlike the

seventh grade sample, the college sample did not have the items read
to them.

The subjects received printed copies of the battery and -were

required to mark their ans\vers on the protocols.
The directions, as given by Rest (1972) for the Defining Issues
Test which measured level of moral reasoning, were printed on the
protocol.

An example was presented to the college students after which

the examiner discussed the example with the subjects.

Directions for

the empathy instrument were the same as for the seventh grade sample
(a four point scale, where 1
agree).

= strongly

agree and 4

= strongly

dis-

The measures of socialization and autonomy required a "yes-

73

no" response that was to he circled after e3.ch printed statement.

No

time limit was placed for the completion of the battery; however,
subjects were informed that they could leave the room when they
finished.

Subjects were asked, on a voluntary basis, to include their

home address on the first page for possible followup studies.
'Instrumentation
The California Test of Personality:

The self reliance and social

standards subscales of the California Test of Personality (C. T. P.) \vere
utilized in the present investigation to measure autonomy and socialization, (intermediate level, form A for the seventh grade sample;
secondary level, form A for the college sample).

Kuder Richardson

reliability coefficients for the self reliance subscales, intermediate
and secondary levels, form A, are .70 with the standard error of measurement being 1.64; for the social standards subscale, intermediate level,
form A, r = .94, with the standard error of measurement being .67; for
the secondary level, form A, r = .84 with the standard error of
measurement being .60.
The C.T.P. is a self report type instrument, comprised of five
levels with two forms at each level, spanning the age range from
kindergarten to adulthood, in which the subjects answer "yes" or "no"
to stimulus questions.

There are two parts to the test, personal

adjustment and social adjustment, with six subscales for each part.
Scores are obtained for each part, for the entire test, and for each
subscale.
The intermediate level was normed on 2,812 students, in grades
seven to ten inclusive, from schools in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
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Hashington, lVisconsin, and California.

The secondary level was normed

on 3,331 students in grades nine to fourteen, from schools in
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and
California.

About eighty five percent of the total normative

population were Caucasians, and the remainder were Blacks, Mexicans,
and other minority groups.
The C.T.P. permits an objective, standardized testing situation
with reliability coefficients for the two subscales of self reliance
(r= .70 for intermediate and secondary levels) and social standards
(r= .94 for intermediate level; r= .84 for the secondary level) being
acceptable for use in the present investigation.

The C.T.P. does not

require the excessive time that is needed for individual assessment
either by interview or the use of projective techniques, nor does it
require inter-rater reliability.

With its five levels, it allows for

longitudinal studies.
The Modified Empathy Scale:

The seventh grade and college

samples were administered the empathy scale developed by Mehrabian and
Epstein (1972) which is a questionnaire type instrument containing
thirty three items.

The instructions given by Mehrabian and Epstein

were such that the response to each item was to be on a scale of +4
(very strongly agree) to -4 (very strongly disagree).

However, the

present investigation utilized a four point scale of 1 (strongly agree)
to 4 (strongly disagree), since it was deemed beneficial to use the
same scoring method for both samples in view of modifying the scale,
and the seventh grade sample could not be expected to differentiate
responses on an eight point scale.
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The items of the Mehrabian and Epstein Empathy Scale were
piloted with seventy nine seventh grade students (different from the
sample) in order to deterQine whether these students would be able
to comprehend items, since the original instrument utilized college
students.

Whenever any of the pilot group did not clearly understand

an item, they were to raise their hands for clarification.

The thirty

three items basically remained the same except for a few minor
changes.

Item number three reads:

affection annoying."

"I often

f~nd

public displays of

It was rewritten as follows:

people kissing in public annoying."

"I often find

In item nine, "of my-

self" was added so that the item read, "I tend to lose control of myself when I am bringing bad news to people."

In item nineteen, the

words "ill treated" were changed to "mistreated."
reads:

Item twenty three

"Sometimes at the movies I am amused at the amount of crying

and sniffling around me."
Item thirty reads:

The words "and sniffling'' were omitted.

"I become more irritated than sympathetic when I

see someone's tears."

The words "someone's tears" were eliminated

and the item read " ... when I see someone crying."

The changes were

made only for the seventh grade sample; the college sample was given
the empathy instrument as it was originally written.
The original empathy scale is reported to have a correlation of
.06 with the Crowne and Marlowe (1960) social desirability scale.
split half reliability for the scale is .84.
inferred in part from factor analyses.

The

Content validity was

Initial studies by Mehrabian

and Epstein (1972) have shown validity of the empathy scale in distinct
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settings, (aggressive and helping behavior).
Since college subjects were used in the construction of the
empathy scale, alpha coefficients of reliability (Cronbach, 1951)
were computed for both samples.

For college subjects the alpha co-

efficient was .76; however, for seventh grade subjects, the alpha coefficient was . 52.

In an attempt to improve the reliability, espe-

cially at the seventh grade level, a principal components factor
analysis was performed.

The first unrotated component for each of the

two analyses was examined.

Items were selected for the revised empathy

scale if they met the following conditions:

(1) the directionality

( + or - ) of the i tern was the same in both analyses as well as in the

original study; (2) the magnitude of the loading of the item in the
first component in both analyses was .15 . or larger.
Twelve items met these conditions so that the revised empathy
scale included items:

+1, +7, +8, +9, +12i +14, -15, +17, +18, +19,

-21, +31 (+ and - equal direction of scoring) from the original instrument of Mehrabian and Epstein.

In the present investigation, the

revised empathy scale was used to measure empathy for the seventh grade
and college sample, alpha reliability coefficient for the seventh grade
sample being .63, for the college sample .78.

The revised empathy scale

for seventh grade subjects had a correlation of .11 with the social
standards subscale of the C.T.P. and a correlation of .66 with the
original scale (p

=

.001).

For college subjects, the revised scale had

a negative correlation of -.36 with the social standards subscale of the
C.T.P., with the correlation between the two empathy scales being .87
(p = • 001).

(refer to Appendix B).
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The Defining Issues Moral Reasoning Test - College Sample:
The Defining Test (D.I.T.) developed by Rest (1972) \'las utilized to
investigate the level of moral reasoning for the college sample.

The

D.I.T. consists of six moral dilemma stories which are read by the
subject.

The subject is required to make a choice among three

options (yes, can't decide, no) in an attempt to resolve the dilemma.
The subject is then presented with twelve issues bearing upon each
dilemma.

For example, for the moral dilemma of whether Heinz should

steal an exces:;ively priced drug for his dying wife, the subject is
asked to consider such issues as "whether Heinz is stealing for himself or doing this solely to help someone else," "whether a
community's laws are going to be upheld," "what values are going to be
the basis for governing how people act towards each other," and so
forth.

Each issue is rated on a five point Likert type scale of

importance - most, much, some, little, or no importance.

The subject

then is required to rank his first four choices of the most important
issues.

It is from these rankings that the score is obtained.

The D.I.T. manual (1974) gives detailed instructions for scoring.
The basic score is the principled score (P score), interpreted as the
relative importance attributed to principled moral considerations in
making moral decisions, obtained by adding the subtotals from the post
conventional stages (stages SA+

5~

+6).

In addition to the P

score~

it

is possible to assign subjects to lower stages by converting each stage
score to a standardized score using the formulas in the manual.
The construction of the D.I.T. was preceded by many hours of
interviewing subjects concerning moral dilemmas and on ascertaining
recurrent types of responses given in the free response mode, typical
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of Kohlberg's stage characteristics.

Having identified recurrent

response types, the items for the D.I.T. were formulated.

These stage

prototypic statements were designed to exemplify the thought structure
of a particular Kohlbergian stage of moral reasoning.

Rest clearly

states that the D.I.T. is an experimental measure and is an attempt
to operationalize the psychological construct of moral development.
The D.I.T. has been used in several studies and has shown definite age
trends.
A correlation of .68 was found between the D.I.T. and Kohlberg's
method which has the subject talk or write about his moral thinking in
a free response mode.

The scorers use a standardized system to score

and classify the responses.

Inter-scorer reliability is computed.

In

contrast to Kohlberg's method, the D.I.T. presents the subject with a
set of standardized alternatives representing the scoring categories
and the subject is to choose among them.
The reading level of the dilemmas are reported to be at least at
the eleven year level and the level of the issue statements to be at
the twelve to thirteen year level (McGeorge, 1973).

Rest has found

that ninth graders, even though not having difficulties with the words
of the D.I.T., did not sufficiently understand the task of rating and
ranking_the issue statements.

For younger subjects Rest recommends

the format devised by Carroll (1974).
The D.I.T. was chosen for the present investigation since there
is evidence for acceptable test - retest reliability (r=.65 to .81;
McGeorge, 1973; Rest et al, 1974; Rest, 1976; Martinet al, 1977).
The D.I.T. produces comparable information with each testing,
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minimizes variance due to differences in verbal or written expressivity, is scored objectively thus minimizing scorer bias, does not
require inter-scorer

reliability~

and since it can be administered to

groups, saves a great deal of time.
The Carroll Moral Reasoning Test - Seventh Grade Sample:

The

Carroll Test (Carroll, 1974) based on Kohl berg's stages of moral
development and following Rest's lead in the development of an
objective instrument for measuring stages of moral reasoning at the
lower age levels, was the measure utilized to investigate the level
of moral reasoning for the seventh grade sample.

The test requires

the subject to resolve a dilemma and to give a separate rating for ten
stage prototypic statements for each of four dilemmas.

Stages five

and six are combined into the principled stage (P stage) so that the
stages for which statements are presented are one though four and the
P stage.

Cooper (1972) has shown that stages five and six cluster as a

P stage on the D.I.T.

In Carroll's pilot study, subjects being eleven

to fifteen years of age, there was inadequate principled responding
to reveal the distinctions of the principled level that Kohlberg
hypothesized.
The language of the stage prototypic statements was written for
average or above average fifth grade readers.

Carroll states:

-

Combining oral presentation of each item with the written form
may make the measure useful with a somewhat younger or less
able sample. At present the measure has been used with subjects
between 11 and 16 years of age (1977, p. 1).
Each stage prototypic statement is evaluated by the subject on a four
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point scale:
reject.

I accept ... I tend to accept ... I tend to reject ... I

For scoring purposes Carroll (1977) reconunends sunning the

raw scores where reject equals four, tend to reject equals three, tend
to accept equals two, and accept equals one.
Reported internal consistency reliability coefficients are in
the 70's for stage one and two, in the 60's for stage three, in the
high 40's for stage four, and in the high SO's for the principled
stage.

Carroll states:
In theory and method the measure is intended to complement the
Defining Issues Test (D.I.T.) developed by James R. Rest. The
measure is appropriate for less able readers or younger
subjects than is the D.I.T. In addition, it focuses on
subject's evaluation of lower stage reasoning rather than
identification of principled issue statements. This measure,
unlike the D.I.T., has had neither extensive replication nor
longitudinal examination ... (1977), p. 1).
In terms of useability, Carroll's test has the same advantages

as Rest's D.I.T.

It is an objective measure scored objectively, does

not require interscorer reliability, does not depend on verbal or
written expressivity, and saves a great deal of time, in contrast to
Kohlberg's interview free response mode.
Statistical Analyses
Hypothesis 1:

In order to test the first hypothesis the follow-

ing statistical analyses were computed for both samples:

(1) Canonical

analyses between socialization, autonomy, empathy (constituting set one
variables) and the dominant stages of moral development (constituting
set two variables); (2) analysis of variance for each of the
personality variables of socialization, empathy, autonomy and assessed
dominant stages of moral development; (3) Neuman-Keuls procedure;
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(4) trend analyses; (5) Pearson product moment correlation coefficients between measured socialization, autonomy, and empathy and
dominant stage of mora 1 development.
Hypothesis 2:
second hypothesis:

The following analyses were performed to test the
(1) Comparative analyses of selected data obtained

in testing hypothesis one; (2) Testing the significance of the
difference between the correlations obtained for socialization,
autonomy, and empathy with dominant stage for the two independent
samples (seventh grade and college subjects) utilizing the Zr transformation for r.
Hypothesis 3:

The third nypothesis was tested by the foJlowi_ng

statistical analyses computed for both samples:
sex as the independent variable;

(1) T statistic with

the personality variables, and moral

development stage scales as the dependent variables; (2) Pearson
product moment correlation coefficients for each sex separately.,
relating socialization, autonomy, and empathy to the dominant stage of
moral development; (3) Testing the statistical significance of the
difference between the correlations obtained in number two above (males
and females being independent subsamples) utilizing the Zr transformation for r.
Definitions
For the sake of clarity and uniformity of understanding, the
following major terms used in the present investigation are defined:
(1)

Socialization is the score a subject obtained on the social

standards subscale of the California Test of Personality.

A social-

ized person is one who has come to appreciate the necessity of sub-
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ordinating certain personal desires and inclinations to the needs and
rules of the group.
(2) Autonomy is the score a subject obtained on the self reliance subscale of the California Test of Personality.

An autonomous

person is one who can do things independently of others, depends on
himself in various situations and directs his own actions, havi_ng
attained the capacity to make decisions without being influenced by
group or authority pressures.
(3)

Empathy is the score a subject obtained on the modified

empathy scale.

An empathic person is one who vicariously responds to

the feelings of another, including sharing those feelings at least at
the gross affect level.

The present investigation focused on affective

empathy (vicarious affective responses to anotherls feelings), in
contrast to mere cognitive empathy (social cognition) which focuses on
the recognition of another's affect and prediction.
(4)

Level of moral reasoning is the stage or level attained by

the subject on the Defining Issues Test or Carroll Test, corresponding
to Kohlberg's levels and stages of moral development.

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Prior to the detailed statistical analyses of the data, the
derivation of the assessed dominant stage of moral development for the
seventh grade and college samples will be discussed.

The statistical

analyses related to the testing of hypothesis one will then be
examined, followed by the statistical analyses for hypotheses two and
three, with each null hypothesis being rejected or not rejected at the
.05 level of significance.

Following the major statistical analyses

for each hypothesis, any further ancillary results will be presented.
The computerized programs contained in the Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (Nie et al, 1975) were utilized for all statistical
analyses with the exception of the Z transformations for r which were
r

computed by hand.
Derivation of the Index of Dominant Stages of Moral Development
The index utilized for the assessed dominant stage of moral
development was that of "exceptional usage."

"Exceptional usage"

refers to the stage a person uses significantly more than any other
stage.

The criteria for its derivation will be presented in detail

later in this section.
-Rationale for Subject Exclusion:

Since all subjects did not

exhibit a clearcut dominant stage of moral development, the sample was
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reduced when investigating dominant stage (college n = 73; seventh
grade n

=

64).

In addition, the seventh grade sample was further

reduced to sixty three, since one person was at dominant stage one.
This subject was eliminated from subsequent analyses in order to
utilize the same comparative sample for the analysis of variance,
Student Neuman-Keuls procedure, trend analysis, and the Pearson
product moment correlation coefficients.
Dominant Stage Scoring Criteria:

As previously mentioned in

Chapter three, the scoring of the Carroll Test of Moral Development
was on a four point scale (1 = fully accept; 4

= fully

reject) so that

a high score for any stage would reflect a low degree of stage
acceptance, while a low stage score would be indicative of a high
degree of acceptance of that stage.

Accordingly, the assessed

dominant stage, for the seventh grade sample, was obtained utilizing
the following criteria:

(A) the lowest score was chosen among the

stages for each subject; (B) the lowest score was required to be
adjacent to the next lowest score; (C) if two scores were equally

lm~,

adjacency was required and the extreme stage was chosen (e.g. stage
one and two adjacent, stage one chosen; stage three and four adjacent,
stage four chosen, etc.).

1

In similar fashion, the assessed dominant stage was obtained for
the college subjects utilizing the following criteria:

(a) the ~ score

1
The statistics presented in the tables of this chapter concerning the seventh grade data and the data for empathy for both samples
will reverse the original scoring system so that 1 = lowest and 4 =
highest.
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for a stage wasZ 1. 00; (B) if two or more ~ stage scores were~
1.00, they were required to be adjacent, with the highest Z score
chosen as the dominant stage; (C) if no stage was predominant and the
Z score for M (abstract, meaningless statements) \'las? 1. 50, the

person was typed as

~;

(D) if no stage nor !i_ predominated and the z

score for ~ (anti establishment orientation) was Z
was typed as

~-

1. 00 the person

Subjects were typed M or~ only if the analysis of

the scores showed a clearcut pattern for such typing.
type

!:! a

~ score~ 1. 50 was required since a Z score

For a clearcut

L

1.50 would have

been misleading in some cases not identifying a clearcut !i_ type.
Findings:

2

Table 3 presents a summary of the number of subjects

at the different dominant stages of moral reasoning for both samples.
Forty-eight percent of the total seventh grade sample was solidly in
the conventional level of moral development (stage three or stage
four); twelve percent was at the principled stage, eight·percent was
at stage two, and thirty percent did not exhibit a solid dominant
stage.
Of the total college sample, forty-five percent was within the
conventional level of moral development; twenty-five percent was at the
principled level, and twenty-four percent did not exhibit a solid
dominant stage.

However, when the H typed cases (n = 2) were excluded,

since the subjects were responding to meaningless statements, and the
~

typed cases were viewed as stage four-and-one-half as Rest (1974)

suggests, then the percentage of college students not exhibiting a

2It should be understood that dominant principled stage for the
college sample = stage SA + SB + 6.
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TABLE 3
Number of Subjects at Different
Stages of Moral Reasoning

College

Seventh Grade

Stage

Stage

n = 96

1

1

2

7

2

7

3

22

3

16

4

20

4

29

SA

9

p

11

SB

7

6

8

n

=

P(SA+SB+6)

64

n

=

M*

2

A**

7

no category

14

non stage
typed ***

23

* not a stage
** possibl~ stage 4 1/2
(Rest 1 1974) not considered
a stage in the analyses.
*** non stage typed = M+A+
no category

24

73

dominant stage, was only fifteen percent.

In the present study the A

typed cases were treated as non stage typed cases.
Hypothesis 1
The assessed personality variables of

socialization~

autonomy,

and empathy will not be significantly related to levels of assessed·
moral reasoning for the seventh grade and college samples.
Canonical Analyses - Seventh Grade Samnle:

Table 4 presents a

summary of the canonical analyses for the seventh grade sample.

It

should be noted that the two sets of variables 1 namely, socialization,
autonomy~

empathy (constituting group one variables) and stages of

moral development (constituting group two variables) are significantly
related to one another.

Canonical analysis yielded a first canonical

correlation of .48 that was significant at the .001 level.

Canonical

variates one reflect that low empathy and low socialization subjects
reject stage three thinking, while tending to accept stage one thinking.

Subjects scoring high in socialization, high in empathy, and low

in autonomy accepted stage three thinking and rejected stage one thinking.
The canonical analyses yielded a second canonical correlation of
.38~

significant at the .026 level, indicating that seventh grade

subj ect_s scoring high in socialization, high in autonomy, and lm.; in
empathy rejected the lower stages of moral development and accepted the
principled stage of moral development, (with the largest loading being
for socialization, +.72, followed by autonomy, +.26, and empathy,
-. 43) .

From the canonical analyses for the seventh grade sample we have
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TABLE 4
Summary of Canonical Correlation Analysis
for Seventh Grade Sample (n = 92)

Chi-Square

D.F.

No.

Canonical
Correlation

1

.48

.63

40.40

15

.000

2

. 38

.82

17.43

8

.026

3

.21

.96

3.76

3

.288

Wilks

Sig.

Lambda

Canonical Coefficients
Group 1
Canvar 1

Canvar 2

Group 2
Canvar 1

Canvar 2

Socialization

-.621

+. 721

Stage 1 +.326

-.233

Empathy

-.854

-.430

Stage 2 -.096

-.598

Autonomy

+.114

+.265

Stage 3 -1.075

-.179

Stage 4 +.027

+.004

Stage p +.026

+1.019
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the following general schema:

Canorlical l

Low empathy + low socialization + high autonomy =
acceptance of stage one and rejection of stage three.
High empathy + high socialization + low autonomy =
acceptance of stage three and rejection of stage one.
High socialization + high autonomy + low empathy =
acceptance of principled stage and rejection of
lower stages.

Canonical 2

High empathy + low socialization + low autonomy =
acceptance of lower stages and rejection of the
principled stage.

Canonical Analyses - College Sample:

Table 5 presents a summary

of the canonical analyses for the college sample.

Canonical analysis

yielded a first canonical correlation of .56 that was significant at
the .001 level.

Canonical variates one reflect that subjects scoring

low in autonomy, low in empathy, and low in socialization accepted

stage two of moral development and tended to reject the higher stages.
The canonical analyses yielded a second canonical correlation of
.48 that was significant at the .003 level.

Canonical variates two

indicate that subjects scoring high in autonomy, high in socialization,
and low in empathy tended to accept stages two and six thinking and
rejected stages three and

five~

thinking, (the largest loading being

for socialization, +.67, followed by autonomy, +.43, and empathy, -.70).
The following general schema summarizes the results of the
canonical analyses for the college sample:
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TABLE 5

Sununary of Canonical CoTrelation Analysis
for College Sample (n = 96)

No.

Canonical
Correlation

1

.56

2

3

Wilks

Chi-Square

D.F.

.51

60.79

18

.000

.48

. 74

27.08

10

.003

.20

.96

3.50

4

.478

Lambda

Sig.

Canonical Coefficients

Group 1
Canvar 1
Socialization
-.48
Empathy
Autonomy

Canvar 2

Group 2
Canvar 1

Canvar 2

+.67

Stage 2

+.23

+.57

-.70

-.70

Stage 3

-.12

-.74

-.08

+.43

Stage 4

-.54

+.08

Stage SA -.84

+.05

Stage 58 -.50

-.26

Stage 6

+.28

-.19

'.

91

Canonical 1

Low autonomy + low socialization + low empathy =
acceptance of stage two and rejection of higher stages.
High autonomy + high socialization + high empathy =
rejection of stage two and acceptance of higher stages.

Canonical 2

High autonomy + high socialization + low empathy =
acceptance of stages two and six and rejection of
stages three and five B.
Low autonomy + lmv socialization + high empathy =
acceptance of stages three and five B and rejection
of stages two and six.

Further Results Related to Hypothesis 1:

The canonical analyses

investigated the relationship of the two sets of variables, namely,
the personality variables of autonomy, socialization, empathy (set 1)
and the assessed dominant stages of moral reasoning (set 2).

The

following analyses investigated autonomy, socialization, and empathy,
taking each of these personality variables separately, in relationship
to the assessed dominant stage of moral reasoning, for both the
seventh grade and college subjects.
themselves to two questions:

(1)

The following analyses addressed

~fuat

is the relationship between

level of autonomy and dominant stage of moral reasoning,between level
of socialization and dominant stage of moral reasoning, between level
of empathy and dominant stage of moral reasoning, for both samples?
(2)

What is the magnitude of any significant relationships?
-

·--~·

Seventh Grade Sample:

Autonomy and Dominant

Stage of Moral Development
Table 6 presents a summary of the analysis of variance relating
the dominant stage of moral development to the personality variable
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TABLE 6
Analysis of Variance:
Dominant Stage with Autonomy for
Seventh Grade Sample (n = 63)

Source

D. F.

Squares

Between Groups
\Vi thin Groups

Mean
Square

Sum of

76.19

3

25.40

450.70

59

7.64

F

Sig.

Group Statistics
Dominant Stage

Mean

S.D.

N

2

5.43

3.36

7

3

7.13

2.68

16

4

8.10

2.76

29

p

9.36

2.50

11

Total

7.78

2.92

63

Pearson r = .38 (P = .002)
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of autonomy_ for the seventh grade sample, with the Pearson correlation
given between autonomy and dominant stage.

It should be noted that

the analysis of variance yielded results significant at the .026
level, indicating significant
differences in the dominant stao-es
as a
.
0
function of autonomy.

The Neuman-Keuls p:rocedure indicated that stage

two subjects were significantly lower than the principled stage
subjects in autonomy.

Trend analysis revealed a significant linear

trend with nonsignificant quadratic trends.
coefficient being .38 (P

=

The Pearson correlation

.002) lends substantiation to a linear

relationship between dominant stage and autonomy.

An investigation of

the means of the dominant stages reveal a steady increase from stage

two to the principled stage.

Accordingly, it can be stated that as

autonomy increases, dominant stage of moral development increases,
that is to say, the higher the autonomy, the higher the stage of moral
development for the seventh grade sample.
Seventh Grade Sample:

Socialization and

Dominant Stage of Moral Development
A summary of the analysis of variance relating dominant stage of
moral development to the personality variable of socialization for the
seventh grade sample, with the Pearson correlation coefficient between
socialization and dominant stage, is presented in Table 7.

No signif-

icance is found in the analysis of variance nor in the correlation
coefficient, indicating that socialization does not seem to be significantly related to the dominant stages of moral development for the
seventh grade sample.
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TABLE 7
Analysis of Variance:
Dominant Stage with Socialization
for Seventh Grade Sample ( n == 63)

Source

Between Groups
Within Groups

Sum of
Squares

D. F.

Mean
Square

27.88

3

9. 30

296.97

59

5.03

F

1. 85

Group Statistics

Dominant Stage

S.D.

Mean

N

2

9.14

2.41

7

3

9.25

2.49

16

4

10.69

2.24

29

p

10.09

1. 70

11

Total

10.05

2.29

63

Pearson r

==

.20 (N.S.)

_ Sig.

.149
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Seventh Grade Sample:

Empathy and Dominant

Stage of Moral Development
Table 8 presents a summary of the analysis of variance relating
dominant stage and empathy, with the Pearson correlation coefficient
between empathy and

domim~nt

stage.

Analysis of variance reveals

significance at the .034 level, with the Neuman-Keuls procedure
revealing that stage three subjects scored significantly higher in
empathy than those subjects at the principled stage.

Trend analysis

did not indicate linear nor quadratic trends, nor did the Pearson
negative correlation coefficient indicate a linear relationship
between empathy and dominant stage of moral development.

It should be

noted that the means of the dominant stages show that empathy seemed
to be associated more with stage three then with any other stage.
Seventh Grade Sample:

Summary of Ancillary Statistical

Results for Hypothesis 1
The ancillary statistical analyses for hypothesis one, investigating autonomy, socialization, and empathy taken as separate
variables, for the seventh grade sample, seem to indicate that as
autonomy increases, so does the dominant stage of moral development.
Although there was a significant F ratio for empathy as related to the
dominant stages, with stage three subjects being significantly higher
in empathy than the principled stage subjects, neither trend analysis
nor, Pearson correlation (negative correlation) revealed linearity.
Socialization and the dominant stages of moral development were not
significantly related.
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TABLE 8
Analysis of Variance:
Dominant Stage with Empathy for
Seventh Grade Sample (n = 63)

Source

Between Groups
Within Groups

D. F.

Mean
Square

236.10

3

78.70

1502.12

59

25.46

Sum of
Squares

F

3.09

Group Statistics

Dominant Stage

Mean

S.D

2

26.57

5.03

7

3

30.19

5.81

16

4

26.52

4.82

29

p

24.55

4.39

11

Total

27.11

5.29

63

Pearson r

=

-.24(P

=

N

.059, N.S.)

Sig.

.034
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College Sample:

Autonomy and Dominant

Stage of Moral Development
The analysis of va.riance relating dominant stage to autonomy
(refer to Table 9) did not produce a significant F ratio.

However,

the Pearson correlation was significant (r = .24; P = .037) so that
there appeared to be a linear relationship.

Trend analysis was

computed and the results confirmed a significant linear term with
quadratic terms being non-significant.

Accordingly, it would appear

that as autonomy increases, the dominant stage of moral development
increases.

Studying the means of the dominant stages one finds an

inversion between stages two and three with stage two being higher
in autonomy than st_age three.

Keeping this inversion in mind, it can

therefore be stated that seemingly the higher the level of autonomy,
the higher the level of moral development.
College Sample:

Socialization and Dominant

Stage of Moral Development
Table 10 reveals that socialization is significantly related
(F=3.68;

P=.Ol6) to

college sample.

th~

dominant stages of moral development for the

The Neuman-Keuls procedure reveals that stage three

subjects are significantly lower in socialization than the principled
stage

s~bjects.

Trend analysis indicates a significant linear term

and non significant quadratic term.

Furthermore, significant

linearity is substantiated by the Pearson correlation (r = .34; P =
.003) indicating that as socialization increases, dominant stage of
moral development increases.

It should be noted that there is an

inversion for stages two and three, in that stage two appears to be
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TABLE 9
Analysis of Variance:
Dominant Stage with Autonomy
for College Sample (n = 73)

Source

Between Groups
Within Groups

Sum of
Squares

D.F.

Mean
Square

32.50

3

10.83

350.46

69

5.08

F

2.13 .104

Group Statistics
Dominant Stage

Mean

2

9.57

1.72

7

3

8.86

1. 96

22

4

9.70

2.47

20

p

10.54

2.43

24

9. 71

2.31

73

Total

S.D.

Pearson r = .24 (P = .037)

Sig.

N
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TABLE 10
Analysis of Variance:
Dominant Stage with Socialization
for Col.lege Sample (n = 73)

Source

Sum of
Squares

D. F.

Mean
Square

Between
Groups

58.35

3

19.45

Within
Groups

364.66

69

5.29

Group Statistics
Dominant
Stage

Mean

S.D.

N

2

11.57

3.46

7

3

11.23

2.45

22

4

12.75

2.27

20

p

13.33

1. 74

24

Total

12.37

2.42

73

Pearson r

= .34

(P = .003)

F

3.68

Sig.

.016
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higher in socialization.

Accordingly, it would appear that the higher

the level of socialization, the higher the dominant stage of moral
development, with the second and third stages being inverted.
College Sample:

Empathy and Dominant

Stage of

~!oral

Development

Table 11 indicates a significant relationship (F

=

2.89; P =

.042) between empathy and the dominant stages of moral development.
Neuman-Keuls procedure reveals a significant difference between stage
two subjects and principled stage subjects with the principled stage
subjects being significantly higher in empathy.

Trend analysis

indicates a significant linear trend with quadratic term being non
significant.

The Pearson correlation being .29 (P = .014) substanti-

ates a linear trend.

Accordingly, the results seemingly indicate that

the higher the empathy, the higher the dominant stage of moral
development (with stages three and four being inverted so that subjects
at stage three were more empathic than stage four subjects).
College Sample:

Summary of Ancillary

Statistical Results for Hypothesis 1
The ancillary statistical analyses for hypothesis one, investigating autonomy, socialization, and empathy as separate variables, seem
to indicate that as autonomy, socialization, and empathy increase for
the college sample, so does the dominant stage of moral development
(with stages two and three being inverted for both autonomy and socialization and stages three and four being inverted for empathy).
results can be characterized by the following general organizing

The
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TABLE 11
Analysis of Variance:
Dominant Stage with Empathy
for College Sample (n = 73)

Source

Between
Groups
Within
Groups

Sum of
Squares

D. F.

Mean
Square

265.04

3

88.35

2111.59

69

30.60

Group Statistics
Dominant
State

Mean

S.D.

N

2

22.57

7.57

7

3

26.64

5.78

22

4

25.95

5.26

20

p

29.08

4.86

24

Total

26.86

5.75

73

Pearson r = .29 (P = .014)

F

2.89

Sig.

.042
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schema:

high autonomy + high socialization + high empathy

= princi-

pled stage of moral development.
Hypothesis 2
The relationship of each of the personality variables, socialization, autonomy, and empathy, with the assessed dominant stage of moral
development will not be significantly different at different ages,
namely, the seventh grade and college ages.
addressed to the following question:

Hypothesis two is

Is there a statistically signi-

ficant difference between the relationship of each of the following
pairs of variables:

socialization and dominant stage, autonomy and

dominant stage, empathy and dominant stage for the two different age
levels?
Comparative Data from Hypothesis 1:

Table 12 presents data

comparing Pearson product moment correlation coefficients and their
significance between assessed dominant stage of moral development and
each of the personality variables of socialization, autonomy, and
empathy for the seventh grade and college age levels.

From the

comparative analysis of this data obtained in testing hypothesis one,
high autonomy appears to be a prerequisite condition for principled
stage of moral development for the seventh grade age level; while for
the college age level, high autonomy, high socialization, and high
empathy appear to be prerequisite conditions for principled moral
development.

Accordingly, it would seem that the relationship between

socialization, empathy and assessed dominant stage of moral development
differ at the seventh grade and college age levels, (i.e. in addition
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TABLE 12
Comparison of Pearson Correlations between
the Personality Variables and Dominant Stages
for Seventh Grade and College Samples

Personality
Variables

Seventh Grade
Sample (n = 63)

Autonomy

Pearson r = .38
p = .002

r = .24
p = .037

Socialization

Pearson r = .20
P = N.S.

r = .34
p = .003

Empathy

Pearson r = -.24
p = .059 (N.S.)

r = .29
p = .014

College Sample
(n = 73)

TABLE 13
Zr Transformations for r for the Two Independent
Samples, Between Dominant Stage and Autonomy,
Socialization, and Empathy
Variables

Autonomy and
Dom. Stage

Seventh Grade
Sample (n = 63)

r = .38(P

=

. 002)

z

College Sample
(n = 73)

r = .24 (P = .037)

Socialization
and Dom. Stage

r = .20 (P= N.S.)

r = . 34 (P = .003)

Empathy and
Dom. Stage

r = -.24(P = N.S.)

r = . 29 (P = .014)

z

p

= .88
N.S.

=

z

= .86
p = N.S.

z=
p

3.09

< .01
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to autonomy, principled moral development for the college age sample
requires high empathy and h_igh socialization).
Zr Transformation for r Between the Two Independent Age Levels:
Table 13 presents the Zr transformations,for the independent seventh
grade and college age samples, between the Pearson correlations
relating dominant stage to the three personality variables of socialization, autonomy, and empathy.

It should be noted that the only

significant difference between the two independent age groups,
seemingly as a function of age, was between the dominant stage of moral
development and empathy, Z equaling 3. 09 (P ( . 01).
Accordingly, even though comparative analysis of the data
obtained in testing hypothesis one seemed to indicate a difference
between the relationship of socialization and empathy with dominant
stage of moral development at both age levels, the statistical analysis
indicates that only the relationship of empathy with dominant stage is
significantly different as a function of age.
Hypothesis 3
There will not be significant sex differences in socialization,
autonomy, empathy as related individually to the dominant stage of
moral development for either the seventh grade or college samples:
This hypothesis addressed itself to the following questions:

(1)

Are

there significant differences between males and females for the three
personality variables and for the stages of moral development at the
seventh grade and college levels?

(2) Are there significant sex

differences between the relationship of each of the personality
variables and the dominant stage of moral development at each age
level?

(3)

Is there a statistically significant difference between
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the relationship of autonomy, socialization, and empathy and the
dominant stage of

~oral

development for the independent male and

female groups at each age level?
T Statistic with Sex as the Independent Variable Seventh Grade
Sample:

An analysis of table 14 reveals that what differenti-

ates seventh grade males from seventh grade females in regard to each
of the three personality variables and dominant stages of moral
development are:

(A) empathy (seventh grade females being signifi-

cantly more empathic (T=2.91; P=.005) than seventh grade males) and
(B) assessed dominant stage three (T = 3.00; P = .003), (with females
being significantly at stage three while the seventh grade males were
s_cattered through out the stages).
Pearson Correlations Between Personality Variables and Dominant
Stage for Each Sex Taken Separately - Seventh Grade Sample:
An examination of table 15 indicates that both males (P = .001) and
females (P = .035) show a significant relationship between autonomy
and assessed dominant stage of moral development, and a non
significant relationship between empathy and assessed dominant stage.
The relationship between socialization and assessed dominant stage is
significant for females (P

= .006) but not for males.

T Statistic with Sex as the Independent Variable - College
Sample:

The data presented in table 16 reveals that what

differentiates college males from college females in regard to each of
the three personality variables and assessed dominant stages of moral
development are:

(A) empathy (with females being significantly more

empathic (T=6.42; P=.OOl) than males);

(B) socialization (with females

being significantly more socialized (T=4.25; P=.OOl) than males);

106
TABLE 14
T. Statistic with Sex as the Independent
Variable; Seventh Grade Sample

Mean
Variable

Males
(n = 43)

Females
(n = 49)

T

Sig.

Autonomy

7.488

8.082

.98

.329

Socialization

9.674

10.388

1. 28

.203

25.395

28.429

2.91

.005

Empathy

Dominant Stage

*
**

Stage 1

17.698

17.016

.83

.408

2

16.349

16.592

.32

.752

3

15.163

13.082

3.00

.003

4

14.093

13.286

1. 07

.300

p

14.628

15.020

.53

.598

* The raw statistics are given
..'

for the dominant stages; so
that, low = high and
high = low, since 1 = fully
accept, 4 = fully reject.
Unlike the previous tables,
the data has not been converted.

** Males n = 25
Females n= 38
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TABLE 15
Pearson Correlations Relating the Personality
Variables and Dominant Stage for Each Sex
Taken Separately: Seventh Grade Sample

Personality
Variable

Pearson r
Sex Taken Separately
Males
Females

Autonomy

r = .603
p = .001

r =.297
p = .035

Socialization

r = .129
p = N.S.

r = .390
p = .006

Empathy

r = -.162
p = N.S.

r = -.126
p = N.S.
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TABLE 16
T Statistic with Sex as the Independent
Variable: College Sample

Variable

Mean
Females
Males
(n = 43) (n = 53)

T

Sig.

Autonomy

9.605

9.774

.34

.736

Socialization

11.605

13.415

4.25

.000

Empathy

23.953

30.094

6.42

.000

Dominant Stage
Stage 2

6.233

3.472

3.97

.000

3

13.907

10.698

2.62

.010

4

18.093

16.057

1. 36

.176

p

3.417

4.243

3.85

.000

* Males n = 36
Females n = 37
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(C) dominant stage two, three, and principled stage of moral development (with males significantly predominating at dominant stage two
(T=3.97; P=.OOl) and three (T=2.62; P=.Ol) and females significantly
predominating at the principled stage (T=3.25; P=.OOl).
Pearson Correlations Between Personality Variables and Dominant
Stage for Each Sex Taken Separately - College Sample:

The

relationship between autonomy, socialization, and empathy and assessed
dominant stage, investigating the male and female sample separately,
is given in table 17.

It should be noted that the relationship between

autonomy, empathy, and assessed dominant stage of moral development is
not significant for either sex.

However, the relationship between

socialization and dominant stage is significant for the college males
(P = .024) but not for the college females.
Zr Transformation for r for Male and Female Subsamples at the
Seventh Grade and College Levels:

Zr transformations (for males

and females at both age levels) for the Pearson correlation coefficients
(sex taken separately) relating the three personality variables to the
dominant stage of moral development are given in table 18.

The

differences between the correlations for males and females were not
significant in any of the analyses for either the seventh grade or the
college sample, that is to say, the Zr transformations for r between
'.
the Pearson correlations (for the personality variables of autonomy,
socialization, and empathy related to the dominant stage) did not
differ significantly either for seventh grade males and females, or
for college males and females.
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TABLE 17
Pearson Correlations Relating the Personality
Variables and Dominant Stage for Each Sex
Taken Separately: College Sample

Pearson r
Sex Taken Separately
Males (n = 36 )
Females (n = 37)

Personality
Variable

Autonomy
Socialization
Empathy

p

r = .288
= N.S.

r = .161
p = N.S.

r = .375
p = .024

r = .009
p = N.S.

r = .llS
= N.S.

p

p

r = .089
= N.S.

TABLE 18
Zr Transformations for r for Males and Females
at the Seventh Grade and College Levels

Seventh Grade
Males (n = 25
Females (n

z

= 38)

College
Males (n

= 36

Females
(n = 37)

z
--·--z = .61
P = N.S.

Autonomy:
and Dom. St.

r
p

= .603
= .001

r
p

= .297
= .035

P

z = 1. 49
= N.S.

r
P

= .288
= N.S.

r
P

= .161
= N.S.

Socialization and
Dom. St.

r
P

= .129
= N.S.

r
p

= .390
= .006

P

z = 1. 44
= N.S.

r
p

= .375
= .024

r
P

= .009
= N.S.

P

Empathy:
and Dom.
St.

r
P

= .162
= N.S.

r

= ;126
= N.S.

z = 1. 09
P = N.S.

r
P

= .ll5
= N.S.

r
P

= .089
= N.S.

z = .12
P = N.S.

P

z = .37
= N.S.

.......
1-'

.......

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
In this chapter a hypothesis by hypothesis discussion of the
results will be presented, followed by a more general discussion of
the data including a consideration of the study's internal and
external validity.

The central portion of this chapter will focus

on the societal and educational implications of the investigation,
with the final_section addressing itself to possible future research.
Hypothesis 1
Canonical analyses of the data lead to the rejection of the null
hypothesis, thereby indicating that the personality variables of
assessed autonomy .• socialization, and empathy (taken as a unit) are
significantly related to assessed dominant stage of moral development
for both the seventh grade and college samples.
The importance of empathy in stage three moral thinking for both
samples is indicated by the canonical analyses.

This result is in

accordance with cognitive developmental theory in that, by definition,
stage three moral reasoning views as right that which pleases others
and is ·approved by them.

Empathy, defined as a person's vicarious

response to another's feelings, connotes that one is able to "stand in
another person's shoes", not only cognitively but also affectively.
In such a reciprocal stance, one possesses the capacity to please
others and by doing so receives their approval.

112

In addition, the

ll3
canonical analyses indicate that for the college sample, empathy is
also significantly related to stage SB.. (stage
intuitive humanism, in contrast to stage
social contract).

5~,

5~

being the morality of

the legalistic morality of

By definition, empathy is humanistically oriented,

so that one would expect the obtained result of high empathy being
significantly related not only to stage three but also to stage

5~.

The second canonical correlation revealed that seventh grade
subjects scoring high on the autonomy and socialization

scales~

and

low on the empathy scale appear to be at the principled stage of moral
reasoning, while college subjects scoring high in autonomy and
socialization, and low in empathy appear to be at either stage two or
stage six of moral development.

This result for the college sample

parallels the Haan study (1971) in which the majority of college
students who took part in the civil disobedience of "sitting in'' at
the Berkeley campus were those motivated by stage two or stage six of
moral reasoning.

In a certain sense both stage two and stage six are

independent of society's norms.

The hedonist (stage two) strives for

pleasure regardless of society's dicta; the absolute principled person
(stage six) transcends the dicta of society.

Viewed from a different

perspective, it would seem that both stage two and stage six persons
are doi:ng "their own thing". independent of societal norms:

stage two

subjects motivated bv satisfaction of their personal needs, stage six
"'

subjects motivated by principles of justice and human rights.
It should be noted that stage two college students were found to
be high in the personality variable of socialization; this appears to
be idiosyncratic.

As discussed above, one would not expect stage two
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subjects to be high on the socialization scale due to the hedonistic
orientation of stage two.
explanation.

Such an idiosyncratic result begs for an

A possible resolution may be had in Kohlberg's (1976)

recent explanation of a transitional stage between stages four and
five. (a stage four-and-one-half).

The college students labeled as

stage two moral thinkers, both in the present study and in the Haan
study, may well have been at this transitional stage.

In terms of

the present investigation, the transitional stage would better account
for the college subjects being high in socialization.
Ancillary analyses (analyses of variance and Pearson correlations) of the three personality variables taken separately, as
related to the dominant stages of moral development, yield for the
seventh grade sample, the result of autonomy being the only significantly linear personality variable (i.e. as autonomy increases, the
dominant stage of moral development increases).

In addition, even

though empathy did not exhibit a significant linear relationship with
assessed dominant stage, the Pearson correlation between empathy and
dominant stage (r =-.24) approached significance (P

=

.059) so that

stage three was significantly higher in empathy than the principled
stage for the seventh grade sample.
As previously stated the present investigation sought to conceptually integrate Kohlberg's interpretation of moral development with
Hogan's developmental personality variables.
exception must be noted;

However, one important

when Hogan speaks about empathy he is clearly

describing cognitive empathy; on the other hand, the present study
views empathy as affective empathy.

Hogan claims that mature moral
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reasoning is characterized by high autonomyJ
and high empathy.

~igh

socialization,

The results of the ancillary analyses for the col-

lege sample in the present investigation reveal a similar patternJ in
that as autonomy, socialization, and empathy increase in intensity,
the dominant stage of moral development increases (i.e. when the three
personality variables are investigated separately in relationship to
dominant stage, principled stage of moral reasoning requires high
autonomy, high socialization, and high empathy).

Accordingly, Hogan's

thesis receives partial support from the results of the present
investigation.

The support is only partial since Hogan's definition

and the present investigation's definition of empathy differ.

How-

ever, as Feshbach (1975) and Hoffman (1977) have reported, cognitive
empathy in the usual case, appears to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for affective empathy, the former being the cognitive
recognition of affect in others, the latter being vicarious, affective
arousal.
In summary, the statistical analyses of the data relevant to
hypothesis one reject the null hypothesis and reveal:

(1) the unique

role of empathy in relation to stage three moral reasoning (for both
seventh grade and college samples) and stages two, 5!, and six (for
the

coll~ge

sample); (2) autonomy as the major variable related to

dominant stage for the seventh grade sample; and (3) partial support
for Hogan's thesis that high autonomy, high socialization, and high
empathy lead to mature moral judgment.
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Hypothesis 2
The results of the analyses related to hypothesis two are such
that the null hypothesis is rejected.

The two different age levels

(seventh grade and college) are significantly differentiated from one
another by the personality variable of empathy as related to dominant
stage.

Age differences between correlations for autonomy as related

to dominant stage and socialization as related to dominant stage did
not significantly differentiate the seventh grade sample from the
college sample.

An investigation of the means for the autonomy and

socialization scores seemingly indicated age trends.

Seventh grade

males exhibited the lowest mean scores for autonomy and socialization,
followed by seventh grade females, then college

males~

and finally

college females who exhibited the highest mean scores for both
measures of autonomy and socialization.

However, although such trends

may be suspected, the present investigation cannot definitively
establish such trends due to the fact that two different levels of the
California Test of Personality were used (intermediate level for
seventh grade sample; secondary level for the college sample) and
these levels are not strictly comparable.
All in all, the analyzed data for hypothesis two reject the nul1
hypothesis and show that empathy as related to dominant stage is
significantly different for the seventh grade and college samples as a
result of age.
Hypothesis 3
Results related to hypothesis three show significant sex
differences so that the null hypothesis is rejected.

Both seventh

grade females (T = 2.91; P = .005) and college females (J = 6.42;
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P

=

.001) were significantly more empathic than their male counter-

parts.

This result supports Hoffman (1977) who reviewed sixteen

studies dealing with affective empathy and reported that

~egardless

of

age or measure utilized, females obtained higher scores in all sixteen
studies.

Hoffman points out that the probability of females having

higher scores in sixteen out of sixteen studies is one in sixty-four
thousand.

Investigating sixteen other studies concerning the

recognition of affect (cognitive empathy), males and females were
reported to be approximately equal in this cognitive skill.

Hoffman

concludes that in emotional situations both males and females are
equally adept at assessing how a person feels (recognition of affect)
but females are more likely to experience the vicarious affect of the
other person (affective empathy).
Seventh grade females clustered at stage three (T
P

=

= 3.00;

.003) while seventh grade males were scattered throughout the

stages.

Such a pattern of scatter during late adolescence may suggest

a transition period between stage four and stage five involving a
phase of conflict and disequilibrium (Turiel, 1975); however, such is
not the case for the seventh grade males who are in the period of late
preadolescence or early adolescence.
College females, in addition to being significantly more
empathic than their male counterparts, were also significantly more

= 4.25;

socialized (T

P = .001) and significantly predominated at the

principled stage (T = 3.85; P = .001).

College males significantly

predominated at stage two (T = 3.97; P = .001) and stage three
(T

= 2.62; P

=

.01) of moral development.

These results seemingly
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stand in opposition to the findings reported by Kohlberg and Kramer
(1969) who found that adult women stabilize at stage three of moral
development, while adult males stabilize at stage four.
Pearson correlations were computed for each sex separately
indicating that at the seventh grade level there is a significant
relationship between autonomy and dominant stage of moral development
for both sexes; the relationship of socialization with dominant stage
being significant for females (r
grade males.

=

.39; P

= .006)

but not for seventh

At the college level the relationship between socializa-

tion and dominant stage proves to be significant for males (r = .38;
P

=

.024) but not for college females.
Post factum partial correlational analyses controlling for sex

(i.e. variability due to sex being partialed_ out) show that for
seventh grade sample, autonomy related to dominant stage is significantly associated (r
P = .124).

= .43; P = .001); empathy is not (r = -.15;

However when variability due to sex is taken into account

we have seen that empathy approaches significance (r =-.24; P

=

.059).

Socialization is significantly related to dominant stage when variability due to sex is partialed out (r = .28; P = .013) but becomes non
significant when sex variability is taken into account (r = .20;
p

= .107).
For the college sample, partialling out variability due to sex,

reveals that autonomy and socialization are significantly related to
dominant stage (r = .22; P = .033; r = .22; P = .033 respectively),
with empathy related to dominant stage being non significant (r

= .04;

P = .379), but becoming significant when variability due to sex is
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taken into account (r = .29; P = .014).
Accordingly, when variability due to sex is taken into account,
empathy as related to dominant stage becomes significant (college
sample) or approaches significance (seventh grade sample), and
socialization as related to dominant stage becomes non significant for
the seventh grade sample.

Autonomy for both samples and socialization

for the college sample are significantly related to the dominant
stage of moral development independently of sex variability (i.e. when
variability due to sex is partialled out or when it is taken into
account).
An investigation of the analyzed data for hypothesis three
indicates that the means for affective empathy do not reveal age
trends but show the following pattern:

college males being lowest in

empathic scores, followed by seventh grade males, then seventh grade
females, with college females being highest in empathic scores.
Focusing on dominant stage of moral development the following
statistically significant pattern of results is obtained:

seventh

grade males being scattered through out the stages, college males
predominating at stage two and three, seventh grade females clustering
at stage three, and college females being mostly at the principled
stage.

From these analyses, college males appear low in both level of

affective empathy and dominant stage of moral development.

An explan-

ation of this seemingly idiosyncratic phenomenon is found in the
construct of adolescent egocentrism in that a substantial number of
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the college male subjects appeared to be going through the period of
adolescent egocentrism .• while the female college sample apparently had
overcome this developmental challenge.

This phenomenon appears to be

partially a function of the college sample used in the present investigation.

The male college subjects as a group appeared to be in the

lower half of their high school graduating class and had not made a
definite choice for future career plans.

In contrast, the female

group was in the upper half of their graduating class and as a group
had definite career plans.
Adolescent egocentrism, according to Inhelder and Piaget (1958),
occurs at the time that formal operational thought is developing.

The

adolescent is primarily concerned with himself assuming that others are
as concerned with his appearance and behavior as he is.
tion constitutes the egocentrism of adolescence.

This assump-

Accordingly, the

young person is continually reacting to an imaginary audience (Elkind,
1974), in that he believes that he will be the center of attention

(audience) \vhich usually is not the case (imaginary).

While the young

person fails to differentiate the concerns of his thought and the
thoughts of others, he simultaneously over differentiates his own feelings, regarding his feelings as specifically unique and special.
Progressing through the period of adolescent egocentrism, the
young person focuses on his needs and feelings 1 distorting what is
pleasing to others.

Having such an orientation, it \vould seem that the

person would be low in affective empathy and would be at stage two of
moral development.

Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude in the

present investigation that the college males who were going through
the period of adolescent egocentrism were those lvho were significantly
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low in affective empathy and at dominant stage two of moral develop-

ment.
Kohlberg's longitudinal data revealed an idiosyncratic result in
that some college students shifted from stage four to stage two
rather than making direct progression to stage five (Kohlberg and
Kramer, 1969; Kramer, 1968).

This would seemingly contradict the

sequential invariance of the stages.

However, Kohlberg explains this

shift by viewing it as a transition between stage four and stage five,
a stage four-and-one-half, since these subjects eventually progressed
to stage five.

Kohlberg (1976) states that the social perspective of

stage four-and-one-half is clearly different from stage tlvo in that
subjects in the transitional stage questioned society and viewed themselves from an outside of society perspective.

This view was in

contrast to stage two subjects who view things as concrete individuals
"relating to other individuals through concrete reciprocity, exchange,
and utilities?" (P. 43).
The college males at stage two, in the present investigation, may
well be in this transitional stage four-and-one-half.

From the

present analyses the data is suggestive of such a possibility in that
the Pearson correlations relating socialization to dominant stage of
moral development for each sex separately reveals that the college
males show a significant relationship (r = .38; P
college females do not.

=

.024) while the

It may be argued that the college males'

social perspective may well be different from the individualistic
perspective of the stage two hedonistic orientation (i.e. one \vould not
expect a significant relationship between socialization and stage two).
However, without further longitudinal data for the college male sub-
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jects, no definite conclusion is possible at this time.
To recapitulate, the analyses of the data for hypothesis three
reject the null hypothesis and show:

(1) significant sex differences

in affective empathy with seventh grade and college females being more
empathic than their male counterparts; (2) significantly higher socialization scores for college females than for college males:

(3) pre-

dominance of seventh grade females at stage three_. with seventh grade
males being scattered through out the stages; (4) significant clustering of college females at the principled stage, with college males predominating at stages two and three; (5) the importance of variability
due to sex (for each sex separately and with variability due to sex
partialled out); and (6) the seemingly idiosyncratic phenomenon of
college males being low in empathy and in dominant stage of moral
development.
Theoretical Discussion of Four Dimensions of Character Structure
Related to Moral Development
Having completed a hypothesis by hypothesis discussion of the
results obtained in the present investigation, we will now turn our
attention to a more general discussion of:

(1) how cultural socializa-

tion patterns may account for sex differences in the development of
affective empathy; (2) the importance of autonomy in mature moral
developJllent; and (3) the relationship of intelligence to moral development.

In other words, four dimensions of character structure (social-

ization, empathy, autonomy, I.Q.) having a reported relationship to
moral development (Hogan 1973, 1975) will be theoretically discussed,
Socialization Patterns and Affective Empathy:

Although
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socialization and empathy are separate and independent constructs,
the traditional socialization patterns for males and females seem to
play an important part in the development of affective empathy.
Parsons and Bales (1955) and Johnson (1963) distinguish between two
roles in any social unit, the expressive and the instrumental.

In

American society females have been traditionally socialized to perform
the expressive role in the family unit, a role in which the female is
responsive to the needs and feelings of others in order to maintain
the family as an intact, harmonious unit.

In

contrast~

males are

socialized to perform the instrumental role, acti.ng as liaisons between the family unit and other social institutions, especially
occupational institutions.

Initially males are socialized expressively

but with age are encouraged to acquire instrumental traits such as
mastery and problem solving.

It is possible that male socialization

practices produce males who are action oriented toward instrumental,
ameliorative action in affective situations.

That is to say, having

recognized the affect of another, the male may be considering action
alternatives rather than empathizing in these situations.

Hoffman

(1975a) and Hogan (1973, 1975) discuss the possibility that humans may
have an innate empathic predisposition.

On the other hand, infant

girls appear to be more likely to cry than infant boys in response to
another child's cry (Simner, 1971; Sagi and Hoffman, 1976).

Such cry-

ing may suggest the possibility of a constitutional predisposition in
females that together with differences in socialization patterns
account for later sex differences in empathy.

In either case (innate

general predisposition or female predisposition), the capacity for
affective empathy seems to be actualized through the different
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socialization patterns for males and females. 1
Hogan (1973) reports that interviews with subjects who received
very high scores on his cognitive empathy scale syggest that they often
suffer from an excess of role taking in that they are "too concerned
with the expectations of

others~

they excessively inhibit hostility

and aggression, and suffer from identity diffusion" (p. 224).

If

Hogan's caveat is correct in regard to cognitive empathy, how does it
relate to affective empathy?

The present study has shown that high

empathy in combination with high levels of socialization and autonomy
is significantly related with principled moral development.

Thereby,

the personality variable of empathy, like those of socialization and
autonomy, can not be viewed in isolation when moral development is
considered.

An excess in any one of the personality variables without

a corresponding regulation by the other two personality variables may
well lead to anomalies of the personality.
The Import of Autonomy in Mature Moral Development:

Socializa-

tion and empathy as related to moral developmental stages reflect a
utilitarian bias in that compliance is given to social norms based on
the larger welfare of society or on self interest.

Kant (i933 Trans.)

argues that such compliance is in no way moral and that the truly moral
person has an autonomous will and is governed by a personal sense of
duty.

An adequate description of moral development requires the

1Traditional socialization patterns are more and more being discarded in the United States. Male and female roles in some quarters
are being reversed. Time and research wi 11 tell us the effect of
these non traditional socialization patterns.
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personality variable of autonomy.

A well socialized and empathic

person might be the model citizen in his conformity to societal norms
but may act immorally.

The example often given is that the person who

complied with the collective societal norms of Hitler's Germany \VOuld
be complying to and justifying the execution of innocent Jews.
Autonomy serves to insulate one from the potential irnnorality of
collective compliance and to facilitate non conformist prosocial behavior.

However, an autonomous person who is unsocialized and non-

empathic is likely to be autocratic and non conformist for nonconformity's sake.

Accordingly, as mentioned previously, the

personality variables of socialization, empathy, and autonomy cannot
be viewed in isolation.

Results of hypothesis one revealed that at

the seventh grade level, autonomy was the significant variable in
relation to dominant stage of moral development (i.e. as autonomy
increased, dominant stage of moral development increased).

However,

in no way does this result suggest that the seventh grade subjects
were unsocialized and nonempathic.
revealed that

fe~ale

In fact, additional analyses

seventh grade subjects were more empathic and

predominately at a higher stage of moral development than seventh
grade and college males.
Relationship of Intelligence to Moral Development:

For a person

to understand basic issues in moral situations a certain degree of
moral knowledge is needed.

Hogan (1973, 1975) operationalizes the

construct of moral knowledge by equating its measurement with tests
of general intelligence.

Correlation coefficients between intelligence

and moral development have generally been reported to be in the 30s
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(Hogan, 1973).

In the present study I. Q. scores were available for

only the seventh grade subjects.

1

Pearson correlational coefficients:

(1) between dominant stage of moral development and I.Q. were r = .33,
P

=

.009; (2) between autonomy and I.Q. r = .16, P = .125; (3)

between socialization and I.Q. r = .14. P
empathy and I.Q. r = -.34, P = .001.

.173; and (4) between

Hogan (1973) reports a correla-

tion coefficient of . 30 between l. Q. and autonomy and reports that
cognitive empathy correlates between .30 and .50 with several
measures of intellectual performance.

However, the present study

shows a much lower correlation between I.Q. and autonomy and a significant negative correlation between affective empathy and I.Q. for the
seventh grade sample.

The results of the present study are consistent

in that there is a negative correlation between affective empathy and
dominant stage of moral development but a positive significant
correlation between I.Q. and dominant stage.

Accordingly, the correla-

tion between I.Q. and empathy is negative for the seventh grade
sample.

In addition, the present investigation is consistent with

previous reports in that the correlation between I.Q. and dominant
stage of moral development is in the 30s.
Statements Supporting Internal and External Validity
The present inquiry sought to support internal validity by
utilizing the following criteria:

valid and reliable instrumentation;

1The measure of general intelligence available for the seventh
grade sample was the Short Test of Educational Ability (S.T.E.A.)
obtained from Science Research Associates.
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objective scoring; selection of subjects; careful examination of all
protocols; control of reading ability and verbal expressivity.
Autonomy and socialization were measured by the self reliance
and social standards subtests of the California Test of Personality,
. appropriate levels being used for the seventh grade and college
subjects.

The stringent criteria, in terms of logical analyses,

experience, judgments of clinical and educational psychologists as
well as teachers, and statistical analyses, in the construction of the
test (with validity studies) point to well established validity.
Reliability coefficients at the intermediate and secondary levels for
the measurement of autonomy and socialization are in the 70s or above.
Since the computed reliability coefficient for the seventh
grade subjects was in the 50s on the Nehrabian-Epstein affective
empathy scale (1972), a revised scale was utilized producing a Cronbach
(1951) alpha reliability coefficient of .63 for the seventh grade
subjects and .78 for the college subjects.

Due to its recency, the

original scale has not been extensively used.

However, content

validity has been inferred in part from factor analysis and initial
studies have supported the validity of the scale.
Until recently, the only available technique for measuring levels
of moral development was the free response method of Kohlberg.
Several attempts have been made at the objective measurement of moral
stages, the one with the most extensive replication and longitudinal
analysis being the Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1972).

As previously

reported, the correlation between the Defining Issues Test (D.I.T.) and
Kohlberg's free response method is .68 (Rest, 1974). · The D.I.T. has
been used with over fifteen hundred subjects with reliability reported
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as ranging between .65 to .81 depending on the age and educational
status of the subjects.

The Carroll Test of Moral Development (1974)

has been developed as a downward extension of the D.I.T.

The Carroll

Test is acceptable for use with fifth grade subjects and above \vhile
Rest (1974) cautions that the D.I.T. is not appropriate for subjects
below the eleventh grade.

Although Carroll's measure has neither

extensive replication nor longitudinal examination, the theoretical
base of the Carroll Test and initial pilot studies (Carroll, 1974)
appear sufficiently respectable in terms of reliability and validity
considering the present immature state of moral development assessment.
The use of objective instruments rather than of a free response
intervie\v gave significant control of subjects' verbal and expressive
abilities while the use of strict objective scoring criteria controlled
investigator bias and

eliminated the need for

inter~rater

reliability.

Incomplete and unreliable protocols were eliminated according to the
reliability criteria given by Rest (1974).

Reading ability for the

seventh grade sample \vas controlled by reading aloud the items while
the subjects followed a written copy.

Sample selection was based on

theoretical considerations presented in the literature (Kohlberg and
Kramer, 1969) stating that the selected age levels were critical
periods for the attainment of principled moral development in adulthood.
In considering external validity or generalizability,the extensive
standardization and norming of the California Test of Personality must
be taken into account.

Seventh grade subjects were chosen randomly from

a greater number of seventh grade students in the same school.

College

subjects were a sample of convenience, necessitated by the inability of
the investigator to obtain a large college population from \vhich to
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choose a randomized sample of one hundred subjects matched for sex.
A logical analysis of the alternate hypotheses for the present
inquiry leads to "strong inferences" (Platt, 1964) of a general nature.
The review of research reported by Hoffman (1977) has shown that
females are more affectively empathic than males.

The results of the

present investigation support Hoffman's findings.

Accordingly, a

strong inference can be made from the present results that generally,
junior high and college females will be more empathic than their male
counterparts.
From a logical analysis of the characteristics of the stages of
moral development and the definitions of the developmental personality
variables, the assumptions relating the stages and the personality
variables might be as follows:

(1) persons at stage two would appear

to be highly autonomous, poorly socialized, and non empathic; (2)
those at stage three would be highly empathic, poorly socialized and
lacking in autonomy; (3) those predominating at stage four would seem
to be highly socialized, non autonomous and empathic; (4) those at the
principled stage seemingly would be well
autonomous.

socialized~

empathic, and

Results of the present investigation provide support for

the logical assumptions concerning stage three and the principled
stage.
It can be logically assumed that a person in the period of
adolescent egocentrism would be less empathic and at a lower stage of
moral development than an adolescent who has passed through this period.
Empirical support is given to this logical assumption by the inferred
results of the present study.

However, it can not be generalized that
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college males will be lower in moral development than females because
in a sample of college students from a different

population~

the

raales might not be undergoing the period of egocentrism which was a
peculiar characteristic of the college sample used in the present
study.
Wl1en one is concerned with the generalizability of results the
issue of ecological representativeness must be taken into account.

The

theoretical foundation on which the present investigation is built
assumes that all people go through the same

sequential~

invariant

stages of moral development, i.e. heredity provides the general
capacity.

In terms of universal general capacity, i t can be logically

inferred that the present study theoretically \vould seem to be
representative of all human beings.

However, this capacity will not

become actualized without proper interaction with the environment.
The question of ecological representativeness seems to be the question
of "will the interaction with the environment produce the necessary
moral conflict so that the person may advance from the capacity to the
actualization of higher stages of moral development?''

In terms of

actualization of capacity, the present study is limited by the environmental forces that have interacted with the subjects utilized in the
sample~.

Societal - Educational Implications of the Present Inquiry
The results of the present investigation have implications for
many societal units such as the family, the school, and the church.
These societal units will .be discussed in the followi_ng section.
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The Family:

A growing body of research has been directed toward

the developmental antecedents of personality variables and parenting
practices in the development of personality variables.

Since it is

strongly inferred from the present study that the personality variables
of empathy, socialization, and autonomy are significant variables in
the developmental growth of moral thinking, a brief summary of the
relationship of the developmental antecedents for each personality
variable and parenting practices will be presented.
Empathy
As has been stated previously, the socialization practices for
boys and girls take different paths in that girls are socialized to
perform an expressive role (being responsive to the needs and feelings
of others) while boys are socialized to perform an instrumental role
(mastery, problem solving, liaison between the family and occupational
society).

The development of affective empathy seems to be related

to these different roles of socialization, so that females, as a rule,
are more empathic than males (see Hoffman, 1977).

However, there is a

strong movement in America today advocating that both boys and girls be
socialized expressively as well as instrumentally.

Such familial and

extra familial expectations would have far reaching consequences
especially for the development of empathic persons, since there is a
growing amount of literature supporting the notion that empathic
tendencies or predispositions may be innate (see Hogan, 1973).
Role taking is an indispensible precursor of empathy in that the
person is required to adopt another's perspective in the awareness and
recognition of the other's feelings.

Hoffman (1976) states, "the
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rudiments of role taking competency may be present before the child is
two years old." (p, 138).

Since role taking is a learned skill,

parents can facilitate its acquisition by using daily real life situations of conflict and asking their child to reflect on how does he
think the other person feels.

Using such a parenting technique will

also afford the child practice in developing this skip.
A state of \vell being and need fulfillment may well be necessary
conditions for the development of the empathic response in that
pressures of egoistic concerns are reduced, permitting the person to
be more open and responsive to the feelings of others.

Warm,

nurturant, democratic and empathic parents appear to serve as significant models for their child in the development of empathy.
Socialization
The relationship of the socialization processes to empathy for
boys and girls in terms of instrumental and expressive roles has been
discussed above.

Research directed toward the developmental anteced-

ents of socialization has sho\m that warm, nurturant, accepting and
consistently restrictive parents tend to produce the most socialized
children.

Successful socialization involves an exchange in which the

child gives up his desire to do as he pleases and begins to internalize
familial and societal norms.

However, for the child to become social-

ized, he must have some confidence in his ability to deal effectively
with his environment.
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Autonomy
Early development of c_ognitive and verbal skills and interest in
school achievement enhance a child's self esteem and self confidence,
while self esteem and self confidence appear as necessary precursors
of autonomy.

Although a high degree of self reliance is not developed

until later in life, the early period of life appears to be most
important in the child's development of autonomy.

Parents must respect

the child's right to choose so that the young child can make choices.
The young child has a need to explore and investigate his environment.
An overprotective parent may be warm and nurturant when the child is an

infant but when the child shows signs of independence, the parent
becomes restrictive and overly cautious.

Parenting practices of

acceptance, warmth, nurturance, reasonable permissiveness in respect
to the child's exploring, manipulating, and investigating, democratic
exercise of parental power, explanation of reasons for parental rules
and expectations, encouragement of discussion and verbal give and take,
and avoidance of arbitrary decisions in that certain behaviors are
clearly labeled as permitted and other behaviors as forbidden, foster
autonomy.

The child is provided by such parenting practices with

opportunities for self reliant behavior and can receive parental
guidance and control.

ln addition, such practices promote the child's

identification with the parents based on love and respect and the
parents themselves become primary models for responsible autonomy
(see Baumrind, 1971).

It should be noted that warm, nurturant,

accepting and consistently restrictive parents produce the most
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socialized children while less restrictive parents foster autonomy.
The maxim "in medio virtus stat" applies here as in many other situations.

Too much empathy may lead to identity diffusion, too much

socialization may lead to blind conformity to societal demands, too
much autonomy may lead to non conformity for non conformity's sake.
Accordingly, a mixture of these variables tends to lead to balance
and mature moral development.
Cognitive - Moral Development
Since cognitive and moral development are apparently stimulated
by cognitive conflict, a democratic milieu whereby verbal discussion is
encouraged in the home will facilitate cognitive and moral growth.

At

close inspection, many of the parental practices associated with the
developmental antecedents of autonomy appear to be necessary but not
sufficient conditions for moral discussion and facilitation of moral
conflict.

These antecedents are necessary but not sufficient conditions

since parents need to be familiar with the developmental aspects of
cognitive and moral growth.

"Do what I say and not what I do" can only

confuse the child since the child is looking to the parents to
provide models for his behavior.
All that has been said concerning the family, points to the task
of

educ~ting

parents to new modes of parenting.

Many high schools

offer courses concerning parenting where the young person receives his
first exposure to necessary parenting skills.

Many parents-to-be

attend prenatal classes and it is suggested that these classes could
extend their scope and include parenting skills as part of the educational process at a time when the future parents would seem most open
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to such education.

The local schools and community colleges could

offer workshops or classes for parents to help them develop necessary
parenting skills for the facilitation of empathy, socialization, and
autonomy and moral growth in their children.
The School:

The traditional adage that the schools stand "in

loco parentis'·' still holds true today.

What has been said concerning

parenting practices applies to effective teacher practices in the
schools.

In addition, teachers can serve as important models for their

learners.
It is during the "critical years" of elementary and high school

that the young person will advance in moral development toward
principled moral reasoning or stabilize at a lower stage.

It is the

avoidance of this stabilization at a lower level of moral development
that teachers with the help of moral developmental psychologists must
address themselves.

Since cognitive development is a necessary but not

sufficient condition for moral development, a young person that does
not reach full formal operational thinking will not reach the principled
level of moral development.

If such is the case, the young person still

has the right of receiving such experiences that will actualize whatever limited capacity that he possesses.

Crucial to developmental

growth is the updating of teacher training through inservice sessions,
additional course work, or a program of guided reading and discussion.
Schools might do well to investigate Kohlberg's concept of a
"just community school" which involves making moral discussion an
integral part of the curriculum.

The theory behind such a concept is

postulated on a participatory democracy which stresses.that solution of

136

school problems are had in a community meeting using the moral
discussion process.

The assumption is that higher moral reasoning

will prevail in these discussions.

Real life moral situations and

actions are treated as issues of fairness and as matters for
democratic discussion.

A school where the students participate in

democratic solutions to problems offers extensive'opportunities for
role taking.

Since moral discussion is written into the curriculum

(and necessary teacher training is given) small group moral discussion
precedes the democratic decision making meetings.
body serves as a discipline committee.

A rotating student

Such a democratic school

presents a social system of fairness and reasonableness but this is
not its primary purpose.

Rather Kohlberg sees the democratic process

as a vehicle for moral discussion and the cause of an emerging sense
of community (see Kohlberg, 1972, 1975; Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971).
Such schools can thus become vital democratic forces in the community
and through workshops and discussion groups addressed to parents, can
function as change agents in offering these parents an opportunity to
acquire necessary skills for fostering cognitive and moral growth.
The lyrics of popular music often appeal to all ages so that they
can be a most relevant and poignant vehicle for moral discussion.
present day popular hit has the songstress singing
wrong when it feels so right"
hedonistic morality.

1

11

•••

A

it can't be

clearly an espousal of stage two

In sharp contrast to this hedonistic orientation

1 From the song "You Light Up My Life" sung by Debby Boone and
chosen as the best single record for the year 1977.
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are the lyrics from the sone "Alfie":
What's it all about Alfie? Is it just for the moment
we live? What's it all about when you sort it out? ...
Are we meant to take more than we give, or are we meant
to be kind? And if only fools are kind, Alfie, then I
guess it is wise to be cruel. And if life only belongs
to the strong ... what will you lend on an old golden
rule? As sure as I believe there's a heaven above, Alfie,
I know there's something much more ... (David, 1966)
The lyrical rendition of Harry Chapin's "Cats in the Cradle,"
certainly will create cognitive if not moral conflict concerning the
responsibility of the parent as a primary model for their children.
Using popular music, movies, television programs, selected
literature etc. in the classroom as vehicles for moral discussion will
bring the world of the young person in direct confrontation with moral
issues that are relevant to the person's everyday life.
The Church:

In a world of scientific and technological

"miracles," a world preoccupied with materialistic concerns and with
the emergence of the so called "new morality," a stage two morality of
self gratification and hedonistic pursuits, the churches stand in a
unique position of not only proclaiming the "good news" but of being
vital agents of moral conflict motivating their membership to higher
stages of moral development.

The scriptural readings in themselves are

potent forces for creation of moral conflict; take for instance the
incident of Abraham willing to sacrifice his son, Isaac (Genesis 22,
1-14); or the words of Jesus at his impending death, "Greater love than
this no one has, that one lay down his life for his friends.

This is

my commandment that you love one another as I have loved you''
(John 15, 13

&12);

or the beatitudes (Matthew 5, 3-11).

In addition to having responsibility of creating moral conflict

138

in their members and proclaiming the "good news," the churches have
the responsibility of aiding their members in the formation of an
"informed conscience."

For in the final analysis.it is not the

rules and/or religious practices that determine the goodness of an
action, but the person's individual "informed conscience."
When the congregation is small, moral dilemmas can be presented
with congregational discussion.

Sermons would have to be geared to

different ages of the congregation; theoretically, it would be a safe
assumption that most adult parishioners would be at the conventional
level of moral development.
Research Implications
The present inquiry being an ex post facto study and utilizing
multivariate correlational analyses strongly inferred that the personality variables of autonomy, socialization, and empathy were significantly related to levels of moral development with significant age and
sex differences being found at the two different age levels.
Systematic replicative investigations utilizing stratified age-grade
samples selected from varied populations would be desirable in terms
of confirming or questioning generalizability of the present study.
An inquiry utilizing other instrumentation for measurement of autonomy,

socialization, and empathy while retaining the instrumentation used
for the measurement of moral development could provide important
confirming or disconfirming results.

In such a study the definitions

of the personality variables must remain the same as given in the
present investigation.

The need for longitudinal studies in the

investigation of moral development is apparant from the foregoing
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discussion.

The author intends to annually assess autonomy, socializa-

tion, empathy, and moral development of the seventh grade subjects
included in the present study as part of a continued longitudinal
investigation.

The primary aim of this additional study will be to

investigate the invariant sequentiality and irreversibility of the
stages and to investigate the function of the personality variables
as age and moral development increase.
The magnitude of empathic arousal seems to be affected by the
similarity or dissimilarity between the observer and the observed
(Feshbach and Roe, 1968; Krebs, 1975; Hoffman, 1977).

The Kohlberg,

Rest, and Carroll dilemmas clearly specify gender and infer age.
Retaining the basic issues of the dilemmas \vi th all cues of gender
and age being removed (as far as possible) theoretically should
refine the dilemmas.

A comparative investigation utilizing the

original (gender-age cued) and modified (non gender-age cued)
dilemmas could produce interesting results.
Hogan (1973) has found that subjects that were highly empathic
appeared to be suffering from identity diffusion and showed excessive
inhibition of aggression and hostility.

Additional research seems to

be warranted especially with stage three subjects in order to investigate possible identity diffusion and excessive inhibition of
aggressive and hostile tendencies.

Since the stage at which a person

operates renders the reason, the motive for his "moral" action, an
investigation of motivational theories as related to the various
stages of moral development and the personality variables of interest
could produce perspicacious results.

For instance, a purely hedo-

nistic theory of human motivation would seem to espouse a stage two
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morality and possibly a highly autonomous orientation with low
socialization and low empathic orientation.
The relationship of autonomy, empathy, and socialization to ego
development as well as the relationship between ego and moral development would seem to be fertile fields for continuing research.

Even

though Kohlberg views ego development as a necessary but not sufficient
condition for moral development, additional research seems necessary to
provide further theory articulation.
Another area of potential research would be an investigation of
Maslow's hierarchy of needs and levels of socialization, autonomy,
empathy and moral development, since the satisfaction of a given need
stage may be prerequisite for attainment of a corresponding moral
stage.
The present investigation indexed moral development by the
exceptional usage of a particular stage.
moral development are:

Other means of indexing

indexing by highest stage of substantial use

in which the highest stage at which a subject produces at least twenty
percent of his responses is chosen as the stage of substantial usage
(Rest, 1976); indexing by the stage of predominant usage at which fifty
percent or more of the responses occur.

Further research appears to

be needed regarding the comparative usefulness of the various indices
.
of moral development.
Continued research investigating age and sex trends in the
development of autonomy, socialization, empathy, and moral reasoning
seems to be warranted.

Interesting research could be done in the

consideration of levels of autonomy, socialization, empathy and moral
development in relation to diverse occupations and professions such as

Ml

Candee's pilot study (1977) which reported that one of the dimensions
differentiating principled stage physicians fron1 their lower stage
colleagues was the personality variable of affective empathy.
Additional research is called for in order to clarify Kohlberg's
transitional stage four-and-one-half.

This research would. require

longitudinal data and must address itself to the social perspective of
each stage of moral development.
Another research area suggested by the present inquiry would be
the relationship of teachers' levels of autonomy, socialization,
empathy, and moral development and classroom climate as perhaps
assessed by Flanders' interaction analysis method (Amidon and
Flanders, 1971).

One could also investigate the effect of teacher

training (regarding conditions that facilitate autonomy, socialization,
empathy, and moral development in their students) on student growth in
these areas.

An additional research question could be:

does such

training act as a change agent for the teachers themselves?

Various

methods of training could be utilized (such as discussion, lecture etc.)
and the efficacy of training methods in producing change could be
compared.
Finally, assessing levels of autonomy, socialization, empathy,
and stage of moral development in active church goers (defined as
those who attend Sunday services at least three times a month) who are
differentiated by intrinsic religious motivation in contrast to
extrinsic religious motivation would appear to be an interesting area
for research.

Intrinsic religious motivation has been operationalized

by the scale developed by Hoge (1972).
To recapitulate, the research implications of the present
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investigations are many, namely:

(1) systematic replication studies,

(2) utilization of different instrumentation for autonomy, socialization, and empathy, (3) continued longitudinal studies, (4) reduction
of gender and age cues in the moral dilemmas, (5) investigation of
possible identity diffusion in stage three subjects, (6) investigation
of motivational theories as related to moral development and personality variables, (7) relating personality variables to ego development,
(8) continued research concerning the relationship between ego and

moral development, (9) investigation of Maslow's hierarchy of needs
and levels of autonomy, socialization, empathy, and moral development,
(10) indexing moral development by highest stage of substantial usage
and/or predominant stage of usage, (11) continued research regarding
age and sex trends in the development of the personality variables and
moral development, (12) utilizing diverse occupations and professions
in investigating levels of autonomy, socialization, empathy, and moral
development, (13) continued research concerning Kohlberg's transitional stage four-and-one-half, (14) relating teachers' level of
autonomy, socialization, empathy, and moral development to classroom
climate, (15) effect of teacher training in moral development on
student moral growth, (16) investigation of training in moral development discussion as a change agent for the trainee, (17) investigation
of levels of the personality variables and stage of moral development
in church goers differentiated by intrinsic as opposed to extrinsic
religious motivation.
These research possibilities have arisen from the investigator's
frame of reference, a different frame of reference could produce many
other implications for research.

All in all, the present investigation

can be of significant heuristic value.

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY
The investigation sought to study the relationship between
Kohlberg's stages
of moral development and the developmental person.
.

ality variables of autonomy, socialization, and empathy proposed by
Hogan as necessary for mature moral development with one major
difference.

Empathy as defined by Hogan refers to cognitive empathy

(the cognitive awareness and recognition of another's feelings);
empathy as defined in the present study refers to affective empathy
(the vicarious sharing of another's feelings).
Two critical age periods (preadolescence and late adolescence)
suggested in the Kohlbergian literature were selected for investigation.
Ninety two Caucasian seventh grade students from a suburban Chicago
public school were randomly assigned to the preadolescent group.
Ninety six Caucasian students from a suburban Chicago junior college
were assigned to the late adolescent group.
for sex differences.

Each group was balanced

Subtests of the "California Test of Personality"

were utilized to assess socialization and autonomy; affective autonomy
was

ass~ssed

Scale."

by a modified scale of the "Mehrabian-Epstein Empathy

~1oral

development was measured by the "Carroll Test of Moral

Reasoning" for the seventh grade subjects and by the "Defining Issues
Test of Moral Reasoning" for the college subjects.
The results indicated that the three personality variables of
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autonomy, socialization and empathy (_taken as a unit) were significantly related to dominant stage of moral development.

However, when

the personality variables were investigated separately,, autonomy was
the only variable showing a statistically significant linear relationship for the seventh grade sample.

In contrast, for the college

sample, as autonomy, socialization, and empathy scores· increased, the
dominant stage of moral development also increased.

This result of

mature-principled moral development requiring high autonomy, high
socialization, and high empathy, partially confirmed Hogan's hypothesis.
Empathy significantly differentiated the
significant sex differences were obtained.

t\-TO

age groups, and

Seventh grade males were

differentiated from seventh grade females by, (1) empathy (females
being significantly more empathic than males) and (2) dominant stage
(with females significantly clustering at stage three, while males were
scattered throughout the stages).

College males were differentiated

from college females in that, (I) females were significantly more
empathic, (2) females were significantly more socialized, and (3)
males significantly predominated at stages two and three, while females
significantly clustered at the principled stage.

Females in both _age

groups were more empathic than their male counterparts.

This finding

was discussed in terms of socialization patterns and Hoffman's distinction between cognitive and affective empathy.

The present study

seemingly stands in opposition to findings reported by Kohlberg and
Kramer who found that adult females stabilize at stage three while
adult males stabilize at stage four.
The seemingly idiosyncratic result of college males being low in
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affective empathy and in dominant stage of moral development was
discussed in terms of the peculiarity of the chosen sample, Piaget's
concept of adolescent egocentrism, and Kohlberg's transitional stage
four-and-one-half.
Societal and educational implications were applied to the
family, the school, and the church.
were presented.

Implications for future research
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EPILOGUE
Maslow (1970) states that he believes that "the ultimate disease
of our time is valuelessness" (p. 82).

Kristol (1974) has pointed out

that Western Civilization in general, and the United States, in
particular, are at present experiencing a crisis in values.

Frankl

(1972) has referred to the state of man characterized by feelings of
emptiness, boredom, valuelessness, and meaninglessness, as "the
existential vacuum" and believes that this vacuum has become ubiquitous with the youth all over the world being engulfedby the existential vacuum.
In light of man's precarious existential predicament, Salk (1975)
poses the following questions:
Is man programmed for relatively short term survival in
which his end may come of his mvn doing? Or is he
programmed for a life in which only those who have lost
the power to discriminate, or who are otherwise degenerate,
will continue to inhabit the planet as long as reproductive
activity continues to supply "victims" of life? And what
other alternatives exist? (p. 667)
Salk quests for the end of the Darwinian epoch, replaced by an epoch
requiring a complete inversion of values, an epoch ruled by the wisdom
of cooperation in which the welfare of the individual and the welfare
of the species are tightly bound.
It has been widely assumed that cooperation and affective empathy
are significantly related.

Johnson (1975) tested this assumption and

found that the predisposition for cooperative behavior is significantly
related to affective empathy in elementary aged children and a predisposition for competition "is related to a lack of affective
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perspective taking ability or egocentism." (p. 870)
The present investigation strongly infers the importance not
only of affective empathy but also of socialization and autonomy for
principled moral development.

A world based on principled.morality

would be a world based on justice, and justice is the foundation on
which a world of love (agape) can be built.

It is hoped that this

study may contribute, however infinitesimally, to an epoch of cooperation, an epoch of justice, an epoch of agape.
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ANSWER SHEET FOR SEVENTH GRADE SAMPLE:
MORAL REASONING TEST
NM<IE
A) YES-NO

BIRTHDATE

AGE
C) YES-NO

1.

21.

2.

22.

3.

23.

4.

24.

5.

25.

6.

26.

7.

27:

8.

28.

9.

29.

10.

30.

B)

YES-NO

D) YES-NO

11.

31.

12.

32.

13.

33.

14.

34.

15.

35.

16.

36.

17.

37.

18.

38.

19.

39.

20.

40.

CARROLL
GRADE
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ANSWER SHEET FOR SEVENTH GRADE SAMPLE~ EMPATHY
AUTONOMY~ AND SOCIALIZATION MEASURES
NAME
(AUTONOMY)

(EMPATHY)

(SOC I ALI ZATI ON)

1.

21.

1.

16.

2.

22.

2.

17.

3.

23.

3.

18.

4.

24.

4.

19.

5.

25.

5.

20.

6.

26.

6.

21.

7.

27.

7.

22.

8.

28.

8.

23.

9.

29.

9.

24.

10.

30.

10.

25.

11.

31.

11.

26.

12.

32.

12.

27.

13.

33.

13.

28.

14.

14.

29.

15.

15.

30.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
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SIXTEEN ITEMS OF THE MODIFIED MEHRABIAN ., EPSTEIN
AFFECTIVE EMPATHY SCALE

*

**
(+)

1.

It makes me sad to see a lonely stranger in a group.

( +)

7.

I tend to get emotionally involved with a friend's problem.

( +)

8.

Sometimes the words of a love song can move me deeply.

(+)

9.

I tend to lose control of myself when I am bringing
bad news to people.

(+) 12.

I would rather be a social worker than work in a job
training center.

( +) 14.

I like to watch people open presents.

(-) 15.

Lonely people are probably unfriendly.

(+) 17.

Some songs make me happy.

( +) 18.

I really get involved with the feelings of the characters
in a novel.

( +) 19.

I get v'ery angry when I see someone being mistreated.

(-} 21.

When a friend starts to talk about his problems, I try to
steer the conversation to something else.

( +) 31.

I become very involved when I watch a movie.

* The

(+) and (-) signs indicate

the direction of scoring.

** The numeration of the items is
that of the original scale.
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